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ABSTRACT 
Since the late 1990s, few incidents have captured the national spotlight more than 
active shooter events. These events are a significant concern to the public, and as 
questions arise surrounding these incidents, the focus often turns to law enforcement and 
its ability to protect the public. Often, law enforcement’s response to inquiries 
surrounding prevention strategies concludes with officials explaining that they did 
everything possible to prevent the attack. This thesis analyzes the history of active 
shooter response and examines why law enforcement focuses more on response 
management than on prevention strategies. The project identifies issues when law 
enforcement, regardless of size or allocated resources, fails to establish a plan to 
track and monitor potential active shooter threats. Comparing four case studies—
the Marjory Stoneman Douglas school shooting, Virginia Tech incident, Odessa-
Midland attack, and the 1 October Las Vegas mass shooting—the research aims to 
identify investigative gaps that may have helped prevent the attacks. It categorizes 
the probability of preventing attacks based on available resources to law enforcement. 
The conclusion points to gaps with information sharing, planning, and resource 
allocation that could help agencies prepare for any future attacks. 
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Over the last 20 years, few incidents have caused law enforcement more challenges 
than an active shooter incident. Mass casualty incidents instantly capture the media’s 
attention, and depending on the severity of the attack, may thrust an agency into the 
national spotlight. As the investigation progresses, the shooter’s identity is quickly 
uncovered, along with any potential warning signs missed by those closest to the suspect. 
In time, attention turns to law enforcement and any prevention efforts attempted by police 
or lack thereof. Ultimately, the public begins to ask agencies what course of action they 
took to prevent the attack? The only way an agency can truly prepare itself to answer that 
question is to plan accordingly before an untimely attack.  
Since the Texas Tower incident in the mid-1960s, agencies have dealt with active 
shooter attacks that have steadily increased in frequency and severity.1 After each 
watershed event, investigating agencies were forthcoming with lessons learned and later 
shared those experiences with allied agencies through after-action reviews or government-
sponsored publications. Naturally, law enforcement trainers focused efforts on response 
and incident command issues. Most agencies gravitated towards issues quantified by 
metrics, such as improving response times, safer tactics, or casualty prevention. Rarely did 
organizations focus on active shooter intervention efforts or investigative red flags, 
primarily because these concepts were not readily available or fully developed.  
In the mid-1990s, the United States Secret Service tasked forensic psychiatrist 
Robert Fein and United State Special Agent Bryan Vossekuil with a study that examined 
pre-attack behaviors shared by targeted threat suspects, potential assassins, on public 
figures.2 That research helped set the foundation for a publication they authored for local 
law enforcement on conducting threat assessments for possible targeted threats suspects. 
                                                 
1 Audrey McGlinchy, “Changes in Police Response,” Texas Tower Documentary, accessed January 
15, 2021, https://towerhistory.org/changes-police-response-ut-tower-shooting/.  
2 Robert A. Fein and Bryan Vossekuil, “Assassination in the United States: An Operations Study of 
Recent Assassins, Attackers, and Near-Lethal Approaches,” Journal of Forensic Sciences 22, no. 2 (March 
1999): 321, https://legacy.secretservice.gov/ntac/ntac_jfs.pdf.  
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After the Columbine incident, experts built upon Fein and Vossekuil’s research and tailored 
prevention measures on the active shooter threat. Most threat assessment guides offered 
recommendations that agencies could modify according to need. The main goal was to 
provide a pathway so law enforcement had a definitive plan and avoided scrambling to 
develop protocols based on limited resources. Some departments took advantage and 
implemented a threat assessment program, but most did not make the appropriate changes. 
Factors that this study focused on were the gaps created by a lack of a tracking or 
monitoring process after the investigation of a targeted threat. In nearly all threat 
assessment models, experts agree that investigators must assess the dangers an individual 
poses to the public and determine if that person requires monitoring. The goal of a tracking 
process is to establish a plan if the suspected active shooter begins to exhibit concerning 
behaviors and mobilize resources before he turns to violence.3 These resources can come 
in the form of mental professionals, councilors, or school staff who can help a person in 
crisis and prevent an active shooter attack.  
The thesis answers the question: What can law enforcement do to track potential 
active shooters? Initially, the purpose of the research was to identify best practices to help 
agencies establish protocols to help prevent active shooter attacks. The study uncovered a 
series of guidelines established long ago by numerous experts that give recommendations 
to law enforcement on case management, threat assessments, and even a monitoring 
process. The research caused the study to pivot and focused on why most law enforcement 
agencies were not implementing these practices and what gaps materialized that led to an 
attack. The thesis presents case research from the Marjory Stoneman Douglas (MSD) 
shooting, the Virginia Tech shooting, the Odessa-Midland shooting, and the Las Vegas 
Mass shooting to examine apparent gaps in the prevention process. In most incidents, the 
shooter exhibited red flags where intervention efforts could have helped a person in crisis, 
but in other cases, forecasting an attack was impossible to predict.  
                                                 
3 James Silver, Andre B. Simons, and Sarah Craun, A Study of the Pre-Attack Behaviors of Active 




Besides showing the importance of law enforcement establishing a plan to monitor 
potential active shooters, the case studies helped identify gaps in the threat assessment 
process. The study categorizes each case study to gauge the effectiveness of intervention 
based on what information investigators had during the initial investigation. Many active 
shooter studies point to evidence where most active shooter suspects display concerning 
behaviors, commonly referred to as red flags, before committing a mass shooting. 
Additionally, because of the magnitude of an active shooter event, most people believe 
intervention measures can always help prevent an attack. The study uncovered that in some 
cases, they were simply unavoidable. For example, in the Las Vegas Shooting, the suspect 
was wealthy, had no criminal history, and kept to himself. He left no manifesto, diary, or 
reason why he decided to turn to violence.4 In this case, mobilizing resources to prevent 
an attack would never occur because no one knew this individual was in crisis. The reality 
that not all mass shootings may be prevented solely on a threat assessment process is 
disturbing. However, the study explains why intervention methods are successful in some 
cases and not others. Additionally, it helps reinforce the need for law enforcement to 
continue other measures related to response to mitigate casualties, such as police active 
shooter training, public awareness training, and site assessments to improve security 
measures.  
The research findings identified noticeable gaps that existed in the tracking or 
monitoring process in most prevention efforts. The main reason why agencies did not have 
a tracking or monitoring plan in place varies, but at the core of every decision is whether a 
department believes a monitoring process is a priority. With so many different problems 
that law enforcement consistently faces, allocating resources for a threat assessment 
program or monitoring process may not seem significant to some departments. Many 
agencies face staffing shortages, and placing resources to monitor suspects who may be 
involved in low-frequency events may be difficult for a department to justify. A second 
obstacle that the study uncovered is related to information sharing, which had as much to 
                                                 
4 Vanessa Romo, “FBI Finds No Motive in Las Vegas Shooting, Closes Investigation,” National 
Public Radio, January 19, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/01/29/689821599/fbi-finds-no-motive-in-las-
vegas-shooting-closes-investigation. 
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do with organizational culture as procedural or technological hindrance. Many of the same 
silos or information-sharing issues that plagued federal law enforcement before the 9/11 
attacks are the same obstacles local law enforcement is experiencing.5 Finding ways to use 
intelligence resources like fusion centers to distribute information is a problem that some 
agencies still need to resolve. The final issue that surfaced was a lack of a standardized 
tracking program. Although plenty of federal agencies have published guidelines for 
establishing a threat assessment program that encompasses a monitoring process, most 
experts have not adopted a universal standard. While few departments operate the same, 
some police procedures are universally adopted as best practices. For example, a rapid 
response to an active shooter event was accepted by many agencies after the Columbine 
incident, and although not mandated, most agencies followed suit.6 Finding a common 
practice accepted by leading experts might help agencies hesitant of establishing a 
monitoring process for fear of civil or legal implications.  
The findings concluded that the gaps identified in the monitoring and tracking 
process were causing significant issues in active shooter prevention efforts. In some 
instances, establishing a threat assessment program was not the only answer, as the follow-
through and notification process was lacking. For example, in the case of the MSD 
shooting, the school had a threat assessment process established but no oversight occurred 
at the district level to ensure the program was working effectively.7 Furthermore, even 
though the police had access to student records via its School Resource Officer, little was 
done to share information about the threat assessment process.8 The notification process 
                                                 
5 The Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final 
Report of the National Commission of Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Washington, DC: 9–11 
Commission, 2004), 408. 
6 John P. Blair et al., Active Shooter Events and Response (Boca Raton: CRC Press Taylor and Francis 
Group, 2013), 12.  
7 Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission, Initial Report (Tallahassee, FL: 
Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission, 2019), 282, 
https://www.fdle.state.fl.us/MSDHS/CommissionReport.pdf. 
8 Marjory Stoneman Douglas Public Safety Commission, 272. 
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after any investigation to warn stakeholders or allied agencies is an important piece that 
often is forgotten.  
The analysis of the findings has revealed a series of recommendations for closing 
the active shooter prevention gaps. First, agencies need to establish a threat assessment 
process that encompasses a tracking and monitoring program to mitigate a mass casualty 
incident. The plan should include stakeholders with the resources to aid a person in crisis 
and help assess an individual’s progress. Moreover, investigators need to ensure they 
establish a process to cease monitoring if the subject is no longer deemed a threat. Second, 
law enforcement needs to make information sharing and notification a priority. 
Establishing a network that extends beyond the initial threat assessment stakeholders 
enables investigators to receive and distribute information quickly. Many states provide 
law enforcement with an avenue to obtain private information from public agencies during 
emergencies or when related to a criminal manner. Investigators must learn to use those 
resources to gather as much information as possible while also collaborating with 
stakeholders.  
With each watershed moment, active shooter prevention techniques evolved, and 
some were adopted as best practices. The monitoring and tracking process did not gain the 
recognition as did other prevention efforts, but they hold a significant place in mitigating 
future attacks. While agencies may find it challenging to allocate resources to a threat 
assessment process that includes a monitoring component, the alternative is to answer 
questions on why preventing an attack has not been a priority. The key to protecting an 
agency and community is not necessarily the resources spent on an active shooter 
prevention plan but that an agency had implemented a plan.  
xx 
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Over the last 20 years, few incidents have captured the national spotlight more than 
active shooter events. They are a significant concern to the public, and as questions arise 
about these incidents, the focus often turns to what law enforcement is doing to protect 
communities. From Newtown, Connecticut, in 2012, to Dayton, Ohio, in 2019, law 
enforcement is credited for acting swiftly and courageously to stop the active shooter 
threat. However, as the suspect’s identity is revealed, questions surrounding the event shift 
to who or what group of people was aware of the shooter’s capability and intent. The 
community then questions the actions taken by law enforcement, if any, to intervene with 
the shooter’s plans to kill innocent people.1  
Currently, law enforcement has no national standard in place to monitor an 
individual viewed as a potential active shooter threat. The lack of a guideline, however, 
does not deter agencies from trying to track potential threats.2 Many intelligence resources, 
such as intelligence centers, databases, and platforms, have standardized monitoring 
processes, but a universal method to track a potential threat is lacking. Additionally, a 
standardized notification procedure is missing to warn agencies when a potential threat 
enters their jurisdiction. Furthermore, if a law enforcement agency arrests a person 
threatening to commit an active shooter attack, it usually has no future contact with the 
individual unless this person goes on to commit a crime. Also, if mental health 
professionals identify a person who may be dangerous but cannot legally be committed to 
a mental health facility, rarely are resources allocated to monitor the individual. Proper 
tracking or monitoring will ensure professionals intervene if they believe a threat is 
imminent. 
                                                 
1 Richard Fairburn, “How Police Can Prevent the Next Parkland: Nearly Every School Attack Has 
Been Preceded by Many Warning Signs,” Police1, February 20, 2018, https://www.policeone.com/active-
shooter/articles/how-police-can-prevent-the-next-parkland-5VEalK9Ma5HH9Y8o/.  
2 Phil Fairbanks, “Buffalo FBI Agents Tracking People Believed to Pose Shooting Threats,” Buffalo 
News, July 3, 2019, https://buffalonews.com/2019/07/03/feds-are-watching-potential-active-shooters/. 
2 
Law enforcement agencies have expanded prevention efforts by incorporating 
threat assessments developed by the United States Secret Service (USSS). While these 
techniques have proven valuable, most agencies redirect their resources after they mitigate 
the threat, believing they are through with the investigation.3 In some cases, providing 
mental health resources is just the beginning of a long process to help individuals control 
their desire to hurt people. Experts argue they should still be considered dangerous and 
capable of committing targeted violence, and intervention techniques should remain.4 
Adding the components of tracking or monitoring potential suspects will not stop every 
active shooter threat. However, in some cases, it could put other systems in place to assist 
law enforcement in preventing and forecasting future attacks.  
In addition to threat monitoring, notification guidelines are another untapped means 
for law enforcement to warn allied agencies of impending threats. For example, if an 
individual is investigated for making threats but not arrested, allied agencies do not take 
the time to notify nearby departments of a possible danger to their communities due to a 
lack of a notification process. Finally, if a potential active shooter suspect moves to another 
jurisdiction or changes schools, investigating agencies are not required to notify the new 
department that a latent threat has moved into its jurisdiction. The absence of a notification 
framework and the cost of not knowing where these potential threats may end up can be 
devastating to a community. 
The principal concern about monitoring individuals revolves around privacy rights. 
Government agencies have developed a variety of surveillance and monitoring models to 
track individuals. Some of these include sex offender registration, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s (FBI’s) terrorist watchlist, or probation and parole conditions. What makes 
these models different is that the people on most of these lists allegedly committed crimes; 
the exception is the terrorist watchlist, which is controversial precisely because it is 
designed in part to track individuals considered a threat, but who have not yet necessarily 
                                                 
3 Randy Borum et al., “Threat Assessment: Defining an Approach for Evaluating Risk of Targeted 
Violence,” Behavioral Sciences and the Law 17, no. 3 (1999): 326, EBSCO.  
4 Borum et al., 326.  
3 
committed a criminal offense. It would be difficult for agencies to develop a program to 
monitor individuals without affording them due process. The public would also have to 
support persons placed on the list based on recommendations from law enforcement 
officials and not by a court of law. For instance, in 2016, a gang database referred to as 
CalGangs came under scrutiny from a California State auditor because it listed inaccurate 
gang membership documentation.5 A subsequent article in USA Today raised concerns 
over “privacy rights and free speech.”6 Officials also alleged that some police officers 
falsified criteria to make individuals eligible for gang documentation.7 That much power 
and authority are concerning to civil rights activists, not to mention the possibility of basic 
human errors. Critics however would argue that providing too much detail about why an 
agency is monitoring an individual might compromise an ongoing investigation.  
Monitoring an individual’s activities when no crime has been committed is a 
precedent that few people may be comfortable establishing. Privacy rights advocates are 
hesitant to allow the government to infringe on their rights, even if it means enhancing 
public safety.8 Critics always point to examples in history of how sincere ideas established 
by the government slowly became intrusions on civil liberties, and some people are not 
willing to take that risk. This study analyzes why law enforcement is not tracking potential 
active shooters. It also examines whether monitoring a potential suspect is necessary and 
whether tracking an individual who has not committed a crime is possible. Additionally, 
this thesis analyzes the constitutional implications of tracking individuals who may pose a 
threat but have not given law enforcement a legal reason to arrest or detain them.  
                                                 
5 Gabrielle Canon, “California Department of Justice to Investigate LAPD for Falsifying Gang 
Database Records,” USA Today, February 10, 2020, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/
02/10/californias-gang-database-under-investigation/4715847002/.  
6 Canon.  
7 Canon. 
8 Timothy Bella, “The FBI’s Terrorism Watch List Violates the Constitution, Federal Judge Says,” 
Washington Post, September 5, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/09/05/fbi-terror-
watch-list-unconstitutional/. 
4 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Why is law enforcement not tracking potential active shooters? This question 
identifies why law enforcement has not made it a priority to monitor or track possible 
suspects. It examines the need for tracking or monitoring potential active shooter threats 
due to public safety concerns with the requirement of upholding the individual’s right to 
be free from governmental intrusion.  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature regarding active shooter prevention revolves around teaching law 
enforcement how to mitigate threats in their jurisdictions. These techniques vary from 
threat assessments to intelligence-sharing methods. This analysis first examines the origins 
of threat assessments and their impact on routine field response in potential active shooter 
investigations. Next, the review discusses the implications of the watchlists implemented 
after 9/11 to prevent terrorism and the court decisions that followed. Finally, this review 
examines the requirements under which law enforcement can gather and share information.  
Most studies in this literature review focus their recommendations on an individual 
agency and do not address interagency cooperation. Moreover, the absence of a multi-facet 
approach inadvertently fosters a culture of isolationism that many law enforcement 
agencies continue to embrace.9 In considering targeted violence prevention, intelligence 
gathering is a delicate issue that civil rights activists continue to monitor. This topic 
consistently materializes in the literature and is an issue that law enforcement must consider 
when making policy or establishing standardized guidelines.  
1. Threat Assessments 
Some experts believe the onus of preventing mass casualty incidents rests on law 
enforcement in identifying a potential threat. In the case of a threat assessment, it means 
recognizing a person who has the potential to commit a mass casualty attack based on 
                                                 
9 Phillip L. Sanchez, “Increasing Information Sharing among Independent Police Departments” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 78, http://www.justiceacademy.org/iShare/Library-
NPS/09Mar_Sanchez_TE.pdf. 
5 
recurring behaviors.10 Once law enforcement identifies the individual, it can allocate 
resources to mitigate any triggering effects. By taking a step toward early intervention, 
officials may prevent the individual from acting on impulses.11 Robert Fein was one of the 
first researchers to conduct a study on school shootings and identify triggering events. He 
determined that some behaviors shared by students who committed acts of violence 
included difficulty dealing with loss, depression, and suicide attempts.12 Fein’s work 
employed techniques developed by the USSS to identify potential assassination threats to 
the president.13 He called for a shift in philosophy to one that examines the “patterns of 
thinking and behavior” that may result in an attack.14 These techniques, such as 
implementing a school threat assessment program, or developing a strategy in response to 
targeted violence, have expanded since the Columbine High School shooting in 1999.15 
The work of Fein and other leading scholars continually reflect on root causes and possible 
triggers of future active shooter attacks. In agreement with most behavioral experts, a 2018 
FBI study into the commonalities of active shooter suspects concluded that most shooters 
gave obvious warning signs to close contacts that the individuals were dangerous.16 
Experts theorize that these behaviors should help law enforcement and mental health 
officials intervene and prevent an attack. 
                                                 
10 Andrew Harris and Arthur Lurigio, “Threat Assessment and Law Enforcement Practice,” Journal of 
Police Crisis Negotiations 12, no. 1 (2012): 56, https://doi.org/10.1080/15332586.2012.645375.  
11 Robert Fein and Bryan Vossekuil, Protective Intelligence & Threat Assessment Investigations: A 
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A common law enforcement technique used to apprehend violent individuals is 
suspect profiling, but researchers have questioned the validity of this method when 
forecasting potential threats. In a 2008 article published by the American Psychological 
Association, William S. Pollack, William Modzeleski, and Georgeann Rooney state that 
while examining triggering events can help lead investigators to determine whether a 
person has the potential for targeted violence, profiling these suspects is difficult.17 A 
suspect profile takes identifying factors, such as past behavioral issues, criminal histories, 
or psychological characteristics into account to help narrow a suspect pool.18 In forecasting 
a person’s propensity for becoming an active shooter, researchers have found profiling 
problematic. In a 2008 USSS study, Pollack, Modzeleski, and Rooney emphasize the need 
to pay attention to specific triggering events that a potential active shooter experiences.19 
These recent events, along with other troublesome behaviors, may indicate the individual 
is planning a violent attack.20 Nevertheless, experts think that creating accurate profiles for 
active shooters is impossible. Some researchers believe the lack of a behavioral profile 
makes it difficult to know when a person may require help. For example, the suspect in the 
October 1, 2017 shooting in Las Vegas, referred to as the 1 October shooting, was found 
to have “no single or clear motivating factor.”21 The FBI’s Behavioral Analysis Unit 
assisted in the investigation and concluded the suspect was not motivated by a “religious, 
social or political agenda” and kept his thoughts private.22 If potential suspects do not 
exhibit patterns of behavior that raise alarms for people closest to them, it will be 
challenging to forecast whether they are dangerous. 
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Threat assessment researchers have continued to expand their recommendations 
and attempted to address threat assessment gaps after completing the initial evaluation. 
After the Virginia Tech shooting, the State of Virginia funded a project that focused on 
identifying how schools differentiated between low-threat levels to the most severe 
threats.23 Marissa Randazzo and Ellen Plummer led the study and recommended the state 
establish a threat assessment standard based on the data collected.24 Dewey Cornell et al. 
concluded, “Threat assessments [are] not an effort to predict violence but to prevent 
violence.”25 In another study, published by the Department of Justice (DOJ), Fein and 
Vossekuil outline the need to continue to monitor individuals considered a danger to the 
public.26 Both documents emphasize the importance of continually monitoring individuals 
regarded as high-level threats and not just stopping at the intervention piece. The Virginia-
based model was a key piece of research that helped close the gap on how threat 
assessments could be used in the future. It also attempted to prioritize threats and provide 
a guideline for school and law enforcement officials. 
2. Field-Based Investigations 
Researchers have conducted several studies on threat assessments, but few offer 
recommendations for field-based investigations. These investigations include the lack of 
information on the initial police response to a potential threat assessment investigation. For 
example, in a study funded after the Virginia Tech incident, researchers recommended 
establishing a team to conduct threat assessments. Based on the panel’s recommendation, 
the university assigned the chief of police to chair the threat assessment team and appointed 
several faculty, staff, and mental health professionals to aid with threat assessment 
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evaluations.27 However, these same studies lack data concerning procedural investigations 
for law enforcement field personnel on potential active shooter suspects. The initial call for 
service is often the most important as the responding law enforcement officer can dictate 
the outcome of the investigation.28 Most experts fail to outline the importance of the 
responding officer in threat assessment investigations and focus on prevention measures 
after the initial investigation. For example, according to the Marjory Stoneman Douglas 
(MSD) High School Public Safety Commission, law enforcement had contacted the suspect 
21 different times before he carried out the attack.29 In one instance, school officials 
conducted a threat assessment on the suspect and searched his residence for firearms.30 
The level of training and experience of the officials who conducted the assessment is 
unclear.  
The main problem with excluding information related to patrol investigations is 
that the data is vital in determining what impact first responders had in thwarting an attack. 
Mario Scalora and William Zimmerman describe the creation of a threat assessment unit 
by the Capitol Police in the late 1980s.31 They state that in those early days, Capitol police 
officers lacked training in conducting threat assessments, were most concerned with 
investigating crimes that had just occurred, and did not comprehend threat assessments. 
They admitted to making several mistakes because of a lack of training in this area.32 It 
appears that some agencies may neglect to train their patrol officers in threat assessment 
investigations. The lack of training may present a significant gap in prevention measures. 
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Information on the initial police response is crucial, as it will help law enforcement 
identify gaps in its investigative procedures or field personnel training. It may be that 
officers, at the field level, are conducting thorough investigations, but without quantifiable 
data, it is difficult to determine whether that is the case nationwide. In some studies, 
researchers have documented cases where law enforcement arrested a potential active 
shooter suspect but who was later released for unknown reasons.33 It is critical to 
understand whether the suspect was released based on procedural policy or due to a lack 
of training. Seldom does law enforcement convey the details of a case, such as whether 
investigators completed a threat assessment on the suspect before an attack. While this type 
of information may be valuable to research teams, experts do not make it readily accessible.  
3. Five Stages of an Active Shooter 
Most researchers and threat assessments seem to have gravitated toward studies 
conducted by the USSS following active shooter incidents. One of the agency’s primary 
responsibilities is to investigate threats against the president and other designated members 
of his administration.34 Over time, the organization developed a framework to assess 
individuals to determine whether they were indeed threats or they were simply venting 
frustrations. Officials could also identify behavioral patterns as indicators of future 
assassins.35 These patterns were later used by psychologists and law enforcement experts 
to craft a framework for threat assessments of potential active shooters.36  
Researchers have theorized that a potential active shooter threat enters several 
stages before committing an attack. To assist law enforcement in recognizing these threats, 
experts have categorized the different stages. Retired police Lieutenant Dan Marcou 
theorized active shooter suspects go through five phases before committing an act of 
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violence: fantasy, planning, preparation, approach, and implementation.37 According to a 
study published by Fein and Vossekuil, attackers begin a process of mentally preparing 
themselves to launch an attack while trying to maintain a normal “outward appearance.”38 
The potential suspects occasionally drop subtle hints to people close to them, referred to as 
leakage.39 Marcou believes the possibility of preventing an attack improves if law 
enforcement can recognize when suspects are in various stages of planning an attack.  
Most law enforcement professionals have widely accepted the five stages of the 
active shooter attack theory. The theory is documented in many law enforcement 
publications and used in training seminars that teach active shooter concepts.40 Some 
experts have expanded the list to include the phase of a suspect becoming distraught or 
demobilizing once officers neutralize the shooter. In his handbook, Joshua Sinai includes 
seven phases of an active shooter attack.41 He adds triggering events as phase one, changes 
the fantasy stage to “mindset/behaviors,” and incorporates “responding to the active 
shooter” as phase seven.42 Sinai does not deviate from the planning, preparation, approach, 
or implementation phase, as proposed by Marcou’s theory.43 However, some experts do 
not address the five-stage method in their research projects, which leads to an absence of 
data associated with Marcou’s ideas. It may not be that researchers are discounting his 
concept, but they may not see the importance of breaking down the time before an attack 
into stages. Although documentation exists from research professionals advocating the use 
of threat assessments to identify a potential active shooter’s mental preparation, most 
concepts are included as one generalized area, and not separated into stages.  
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Historically, threat mitigation has focused on the early stages of the fantasy and 
planning phase when it is possible to intervene through the judicial process or to allocate 
mental health services. The problem with applying a blanket concept, as opposed to 
categorizing in stages, is that it leads to a lack of a standardized process. In most cases, 
federal recommendations or guidelines encourage law enforcement to implement change, 
and a blanket concept may lead to problems with the threat assessment and mitigation 
process.44 Categorizing each phase simplifies the process for field officers and 
investigators alike to help them understand how active shooter incidents unfold.45 
4. Watchlist  
Some of the most controversial programs implemented after the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks were the Terrorism Watchlist and the associated Terrorist Screening Database.46 
To identify persons who may be a threat to national security, the government enacted a 
variety of measures to monitor individuals deemed a threat and suspend their individual 
liberties, such as flying on commercial aircraft.47 The topic of placing people on a watchlist 
is essential to this research project, as it inevitably parallels arguments made for an active 
shooter watchlist or notification process. Privacy rights, eligibility requirements, and 
adherence to due process are issues that counterterrorism officials must consider when 
creating or adjusting policy.48  
Opponents and supporters agree that transparency issues are difficult to navigate. 
Critics argue that it is unfair to place people on a watchlist and not notify them of being 
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suspected of supporting terrorist activities.49 In Elhady v. Kable, a 2019 federal court case 
questioning the validity of 23 Muslim-Americans placed on a watchlist, a U.S. District 
Court judge ruled that inclusion of certain people on the terrorist watchlist was 
unconstitutional.50 Supporters of the terrorist watchlist, on the other hand, believe it 
essential to keep suspected terrorists confidential in the interest of national security.51 
Months after the initial ruling in Elhady, the court allowed government officials to rewrite 
the watchlist’s criteria and then submit the changes to the court for review.52 One of the 
primary arguments for keeping the lists confidential is that doing otherwise may 
compromise ongoing investigations. It appears both critics and supporters can agree on this 
position, but finding this balance has become somewhat troublesome.  
Although both sides agree that certain types of information should remain 
confidential, they disagree on how someone is placed initially on the list. According to a 
leaked documented referred to as the Watchlisting Guidelines, persons are placed on the 
list if they meet different criteria and pose a threat to national security.53 Critics, such as 
the American Civil Liberties Union, have accused government officials of depriving 
individuals of certain liberties based on hunches.54 Several court decisions have directed 
government officials to alter their procedures and allow people to dispute their placement 
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on these lists.55 For example, in United States v. Mohamud, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals ruled that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment and upheld a lower court’s ruling. However, in Latif v. Holder, a 
Federal District Court ruled that the “no-fly” description was vague and violated the Fifth 
Amendment by not allowing people an “appropriate procedure” to dispute their inclusion 
on the list.56 As the competing interests between national security and an individual’s 
constitutional rights continually clash, it is evident that finding a balance may be a 
persistent challenge.57  
An estimated one million people are on the FBI watchlist, but little information 
exists to determine whether the program is accomplishing its goals.58 Civil rights advocates 
believe monitoring systems, such as the terrorist watchlists and Terrorist Screening 
Database, provide little evidence they can prevent a terrorist attack.59 In 2007, a DOJ audit 
found that the Terrorist Screening Center contained “inaccurate or inconsistent 
information” and lacked notable individuals who “should have been included in the list.”60 
The absence of noteworthy information or inclusion of innocent individuals on a watchlist 
is enough to make the public suspicious of any type of government monitoring system. 
Additional information on the prevention of potential attacks is a critical element of this 
project’s analysis. The ability to compare and contrast the different models and frameworks 
used to monitor potential terrorists could help in developing an active shooter monitoring 
framework.  
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5. Information Sharing 
When attempting to establish an active shooter notification system or create a 
watchlist framework, law enforcement must determine what information is already shared 
by government agencies. Intelligence officials at all levels agree that sharing vital 
information with other law enforcement agencies is one of the crucial steps toward catching 
a known criminal. However, if a law enforcement officer does not have probable cause to 
arrest a person, that information is usually kept within an agency. Criminal Intelligence 
Systems Operating Policies, 28 C.F.R. 23, sets out criteria for intelligence sharing with 
other agencies and outlines proper policy.61 For an agency to share intelligence, the 
information needs to follow a set standard. The policy states that if an agency believes in 
“a reasonable possibility” that the person it is investigating is involved in criminal activity 
then the information can be collected and shared.62 If the information has no criminal 
nexus, it can be kept in-house but not shared with outside agencies.63  
Experts believe law enforcement suffers from a lack of information sharing 
between local agencies. These problems are not unlike those that materialized within 
federal intelligence agencies before the 9/11 attacks. In his master’s thesis for the Naval 
Postgraduate School, Phillip Sanchez concludes that some agencies are selective with the 
type of information they share or refuse to disseminate any kind of intelligence.64 The 
reasons police executives fail to push information sharing vary from adopting an 
isolationist approach to not believing their agency has anything to offer the intelligence 
community.65 These barriers would have to be overcome before any national standard 
could be established for tracking and monitoring potential active shooters. 
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Law enforcement also needs to implement new ways of sharing information. The 
law allows intelligence sharing between different government entities, and these resources 
may be helpful. However, data are lacking about the effects of law enforcement’s sharing 
intelligence with non–law enforcement agencies. School districts and law enforcement 
have worked together for years, and as threat assessment investigations become the norm, 
this partnership could continue to grow. Under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy 
Act (FERPA), schools can share information with law enforcement if it pertains to “safety 
emergencies.”66 These resources may be overlooked at times, but they may offer valuable 
pieces of intelligence. In some instances, the law allows state services to share intelligence 
with law enforcement on criminal proceedings. In California, non–law enforcement 
government agencies can share information related to a criminal matter under California 
code § 18850.3.67 These resources include agencies that provide social services similar to 
welfare services or public unemployment agencies. This type of intelligence sharing is an 
avenue that may assist with tracking or monitoring potential active shooters. 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis examines why law enforcement is not actively monitoring potential 
active shooters and why it lacks guidance for a standardized process. The gap analysis 
process methodology is used to research what is missing from the overall method of 
preventing active shooter attacks. The thesis also examines which systems are in place that 
may help with tracking a suspect’s activities and those that are underutilized.  
As law enforcement and health professionals explore ways to prevent future active 
shooter attacks, officials have emphasized in-depth threat assessment investigations. While 
these techniques are essential, it is equally important to realize the specific issues that arise 
when an investigation is concluded prematurely. It is also crucial that investigators explore 
every avenue before a case is closed. Once law enforcement arrests a suspect, who is then 
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committed to a mental health facility, or when a troubled individual is set free, a gap in 
time materializes. If not properly monitored, the suspect could fantasize, plan, and 
ultimately, carry out an active shooter attack.  
This research analyzes three case studies whereby law enforcement had contact 
with a suspect who went on to assault innocent people. A fourth case study is also examined 
to determine if any warning signs may have prevented an attack. For each case study, this 
project examines what resources were committed to the initial investigation. Additionally, 
the study analyzes what steps law enforcement took in allocating mental health resources 
once it learned of a potential threat. Examining prior case studies offers a way to pinpoint 
where law enforcement suffered gaps in resource allocation, intelligence sharing, and 
resource management. Case study evaluation also helps identify the feasibility of using a 
tracking system, as well as whether viable solutions exist to prevent targeted violence.68  
This project also evaluates the active shooter guides published by the FBI, USSS, 
and various other law enforcement experts. The publications provide an outline for law 
enforcement and school officials on establishing a threat assessment plan. The guides give 
detailed information on threat assessment investigations, red flags, case management, and 
implementing a monitoring process. While the threat assessment programs vary, the 
fundamental goal of prevention and intervention are a constant. Additionally, the 
suggestions in the active shooter guides allow for flexibility so any agency, regardless of 
size, can modify them to fit its policies and procedures.  
This thesis does not examine the different tactics used in response to an active 
shooter, nor does it focus on in-depth techniques by officials tasked with conducting threat 
assessment investigations. Experts have thoroughly studied both topics. However, to add 
context to this project, elements of these topics, such as threat assessments and information 
sharing, are included in the research. It is important to include these topics to analyze the 
case studies critically and pinpoint any commonalities in the shooter’s behaviors. The 
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topics also assists with analyzing any investigative methods currently considered best 
practices and their impact in preventing targeted violence.  
Once completed, the study determines why law enforcement is not actively 
monitoring potential active shooters. The research provides an understanding as to what 
systems or policies are in place that may help with this problem. Additionally, this study 
attempts to answer the question of whether monitoring is needed. While a gap may exist 
with intelligence sharing and information dissemination, the study also determines whether 
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II. LESSONS LEARNED: AN EVOLUTION OF ACTIVE 
SHOOTER PREVENTION METHODS 
On January 25, 2014, shots erupted in the second story of a Maryland mall. As 
panic sunk into the hearts of countless shoppers, people began running away from the loud 
bangs. One man grabbed a child nearby and had the child’s mother follow him toward an 
exit while passing people as they fell to the ground. Others fled to nearby stores and hoped 
they would be safe but not knowing for sure whether the shooter would follow them.69 
While turmoil ensued at the mall, police officers immediately responded to the scene, with 
the first units arriving within two minutes. Responding officers found two employees 
fatally shot at a clothing store, a third wounded, and the 19-year-old male shooter dead 
from a self-inflicted gunshot wound.70 The responding agency, the Howard County Police 
Department, was lauded for its quick response. However, while the chief was proud of his 
department, he admitted to several lessons learned in the aftermath. He used his agency’s 
experience as a way to help others deal with future events. 
Unfortunately, active shooter events have been so frequent in this country that law 
enforcement is becoming better at its initial response and investigation procedures. The 
following chapter shows a progression of how police response has evolved and explores 
why certain gaps in prevention still exist. The research also illustrates why law enforcement 
has focused on certain aspects of procedure, such as response, rather than addressing 
prevention measures. A review of past incidents shows that officials continually learn from 
previous successes and failures to protect their communities from similar tragedies. 
However, the one consistent gap from most incidents is the absence of a monitoring or 
tracking process to mitigate threats. This chapter discusses some lessons learned from 
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active shooter events and highlights how certain events forced a paradigm shift in active 
shooter response, training, and investigations to seeing the value in prevention techniques.  
A. BACKGROUND 
The evolution of combating active shooter threats started on August 1, 1966, when 
Charles Whitman took a sniper position on top of the University of Texas clock tower and 
began shooting indiscriminately.71 From the observation deck, Whitman had a 360-degree 
view and used the tower’s observation deck as cover while he shot at his victims. Law 
enforcement and private citizens armed with rifles shot at Whitman, but his position of 
advantage was far superior to theirs. After an hour of Whitman’s shooting spree, three 
officers and a private citizen stormed the tower and forced their way onto the observation 
deck. As they entered the observation deck, two officers went north while the third officer 
and citizen searched to south. Both groups of men encountered the suspect as they rounded 
their respective corners and shot him several times. When it was over, 17 people lay dead, 
including Whitman, and another 31 were injured.72 According to Pete Blair, director of 
Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT), law enforcement had 
not prepared for this type of attack and immediately began implementing policies and 
procedures to respond to such incidents. He explains that one such procedure borne from 
the Texas Tower massacre and similar incidents was the establishment of the Los Angeles 
Police Department’s (LAPD’s) Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team, which was 
the nation’s first SWAT team designed to address violent encounters beyond the 
capabilities of a patrol response.73  
Over the next 40 years, police responses emphasized safe and patient tactics that 
overwhelmed suspects with additional resources and technological advances. For example, 
law enforcement used the surround-and-callout method, which involved surrounding a 
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location and deploying a SWAT team of specially trained officers to resolve hostile 
situations through negotiations and compromise. Forcing a deadly encounter was 
considered only as a last resort when all other methods had failed. Despite the success of 
this technique, Blair believes this philosophy backfired during the Columbine incident. In 
the spring of 1999, two teenage students entered Columbine High School in Littleton, 
Colorado, and killed 12 of their classmates, which marked one of the deadliest school 
shootings in American history.74 Officers had followed protocol in their response to the 
Columbine incident; they surrounded the location, tried to establish communication with 
the suspects, and waited for the SWAT team to arrive. The problem with these tactics was 
that once the Columbine shooters knew law enforcement would not enter the school, they 
continued shooting and killing innocent people. Following the incident, investigators 
combed through video and realized the suspects had shot and killed many victims while 
officers were waiting for additional resources.75 The tragedy that ensued after law 
enforcement chose to wait for additional resources showed that active shooter tactics 
needed to change and become more decentralized. Additionally, experts started examining 
ways of preventing such tragic events, and looking into any warning signs that would help 
with prevention efforts. 
Law enforcement learned many lessons from the Columbine incident and quickly 
focused its efforts on prevention and response. The USSS was instrumental in sharing its 
techniques for assessing threats against the president, and soon, experts modified these 
techniques to assess school threats.76 These techniques were helpful in teaching law 
enforcement officials how to evaluate subjects. Additionally, law enforcement experts, 
such as the FBI, educated school staff on concerning communication, called leakage, where 
a suspect conveyed an intent to harm others. As a result of the additional training, new 
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guidelines stressed the importance of faculty recognizing those behaviors and taking action 
if they witnessed warning signs.77 
Law enforcement also received additional training as a result of the Columbine 
incident. Police response changed from a surround-and-callout tactic to more robust 
techniques, and officers trained not to rely on SWAT during active shooter incidents 
because of the delayed response from specialized teams.78 Experts trained patrol officers 
to form four- to five-officer contact teams and actively look for the suspect. However, 
smaller agencies are trained to respond with two to three officer contact teams.79 Speed 
was essential, as every second spent gave the shooter the time to target additional victims. 
Agencies trained officers to leave injured victims behind while they searched for the 
suspect, with the understanding that additional personnel would soon arrive to render aid.80 
The concepts became the standard for an active shooter response, which was a significant 
turning point in law enforcement’s response to active shooter threats and would be the 
norm for almost a decade.81 
As active shooter incidents continued throughout the early part of the 21st century, 
officials began to look beyond the initial police response and concentrate on intervention 
efforts from multiple stakeholders. The importance of communication and information 
sharing was apparent during the Virginia Tech shooting. On April 28, 2007, a disgruntled 
Virginia Tech student entered the university armed with two handguns, shot and killed 32 
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people, and wounded another 17 before taking his own life.82 The suspect had been 
referred to mental health professionals a few months before the attack but was ultimately 
found not to need “involuntary hospitalization.”83 Immediately after the incident, Virginia 
Governor Timothy Kaine issued an executive order and established a panel to investigate 
the events that led to the shooting, with the goal of crafting a comprehensive report and 
recommendations in hopes of preventing future attacks.84 In its final report, the panel 
concluded that students were not provided with proper mental health services and lacked 
outpatient resources.85 The final report spurred reform, and in the months that followed, 
the Commonwealth of Virginia codified several laws requiring that public institutions 
establish threat assessment teams and violence prevention committees.86 The 
implementation of these programs was crucial because the lessons learned from the 
Virginia Tech shooting helped lay a foundation nationwide for law enforcement, mental 
health professionals, and school officials to begin a collaborative effort to prevent future 
attacks.  
These horrific incidents—shootings at the University of Texas, Columbine High 
School, and Virginia Tech—led police to develop new techniques to prevent the next 
attack. Nevertheless, they also became touchstones for future active shooters, who sought 
notoriety from the tragedies they inflicted.87 Law enforcement continually trained in 
prevention techniques, but as each incident became more deadly, the public felt that more 
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could be done to stop these attacks. Emotions run high after mass casualty events, and law 
enforcement agencies often find themselves as targets of that criticism. Whether that 
criticism is warranted is up for debate, but clearly, the public expects officials to have 
procedures in place to keep their loved ones safe. It is up to law enforcement agencies to 
ensure those procedures succeed, and ideally secure protocol before a mass shooting occurs 
in their jurisdiction. The following sections highlight some prevention protocols 
implemented to help mitigate active shooter incidents.  
B. PREVENTION TECHNIQUES 
Prevention and training can only do so much to prevent an active shooter attack. 
After each major attack, most active shooter experts study after-action reports to gain 
insight into lessons learned from each tragic event in hopes of enacting change when 
needed. The recommendations offer a glimpse into what law enforcement might consider 
implementing to protect the community better. This section explores different techniques 
used to help mitigate liability and prevent active shooter incidents. 
1. First Responder Training and Mindset 
One of the key lessons from early active shooter after-action incidents was the need 
for additional training for local law enforcement. Most law enforcement officials did not 
stress prevention but rather the response during and after an attack. This approach is 
important to the research, as it is apparent most officials almost always focused on how an 
active shooter incident ended versus what led an individual to launch an attack. 
Coincidently, most law enforcement experts focused on training officers in controlling and 
stabilizing an active incident. Whether it was the need to establish the Incident Command 
System (ICS), assemble contact teams to neutralize the threat, or integrate fire personnel 
into rescue task forces, officials believed training could address highlighted errors. In a 
study conducted by Tracy Frazzano on small agency response to active shooter incidents, 
she interviewed several officers involved in active shooter incidents. Frazzano concluded 
that most officer interviewees agreed that the lack of planning and coordinated response 
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caused confusion.88 For the most part, most of those officers agreed that law enforcement 
had made drastic improvements in coordination and planning since their incidents.  
Moreover, many of the critical lessons revolved around response, tactics, 
emergency care, or community outreach. For example, ALERRT, widely recognized as a 
premier active shooter training program, has dedicated training for law enforcement in 
rapid response tactics, but does not offer courses in prevention or intervention 
techniques.89 To be fair, ALERRT has built a strong reputation on training civilian and 
law enforcement to address active shooter threats, but such a focus begs the question: Why 
does the training focus solely on response? 
The after-action reviews have highlighted errors in investigative techniques and 
missed warning signs. These recommendations included response-training points, but early 
trainers tended to concentrate more on the tactical aspect of the recommendations. Officials 
reviewed every topic to ascertain what elements could help prevent future active shooter 
events. Most experts, like former FBI Deputy Director Mark Giuliano, believed that with 
proper instruction, law enforcement could reduce the loss of life by “shaving seconds” in 
their response, and thereby stop the threat before becoming inundated with life-threatening 
injuries.90 In a 14-year study, from 2000–2013, the FBI concluded that the United States 
was averaging more than one active shooter incident a month. The trend seemed to be on 
the rise, which led the FBI, as well as other law enforcement agencies, to focus on active 
shooter training. Speed became a point of emphasis, and the conversion to this mind-set 
was taken from other aspects of after-action reviews. For example, a solo-officer response, 
discussed later in this chapter, is one way to shave time, as officers would not have to wait 
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for additional officers.91 The mere presence of a single law enforcement officer may cause 
the suspect to surrender, flee, or commit suicide.  
Rapid response training has been adopted by most agencies for active shooter 
responses. While law enforcement officials believed active shooter training was essential, 
most states did not identify it as essential training, nor was training law enforcement a 
federal mandate.92 For most departments, receiving rapid response training was viewed as 
a necessity, but each agency and state dictated their own requirements. For example, 
California’s Police Officers Standard’s and Training, the organization that establishes 
training standards for peace officers in California, does not require active shooter training, 
and some departments can go years without receiving instruction.93 Moreover, when 
officers from the San Bernardino Police Department responded to an active shooter 
incident in 2015, a police lieutenant later admitted to having received no active shooter 
training since 2000.94 In a 2020 interview, he explained that while it had been almost 15 
years since he had received active shooter training, he credited the methods taught during 
those sessions as instrumental to how his officers responded. The after-action report 
concluded that most of the police department had received active shooter training in 2000, 
2007, and 2012.95 Alternatively, since 2000, the Modesto Police Department in California 
has required officers receive active shooter training every other year.96 More evidence in 
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inconsistency among departments was manifested when in 2014, while participating in an 
active shooter seminar sponsored by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), the 
police chief of Sparks, Nevada, explained that his department trains in active shooter 
response every three to four years and is continually modifying its tactics.97 Therefore, 
while the need for well-trained officers has been a key lesson learned after most debriefs, 
periodical training for officers has not been standardized. Additionally, panel experts at the 
forum advocated that agencies in proximity to each other train and adopt similar tactics.98  
While quality training might have been lacking in some areas, such as tactical 
response or police/fire integration, a cultural shift in law enforcement emphasized 
“mitigating risk not avoiding risk” to save innocent people during mass casualty events.99 
After the Virginia Tech shooting, experts began exploring one-person response techniques 
and implementing procedures for integrating fire personnel into rescue task forces.100 The 
implementation of a solo officer response was a major shift from the small element, three-
to-four person response in that it taught officers to enter an active shooter incident alone. 
The goal was to neutralize the threat quickly by forcing the suspect to flee or surrender, or 
engage the suspect using deadly force.101 The solo-person response was not a popular 
tactic with most seasoned experts, but with police response taking an average of three 
minutes before the first officer arrived, many officers began asking themselves how many 
rounds they could fire in three minutes.102 The technique gathered support as active shooter 
incidents continued, particularly after the Sandy Hook shooting, where the suspect shot 
and killed four adults and 20 first-graders and injured nine other children.  
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The integration of police and fire personnel was also a shift in philosophy. Fire and 
emergency medical service (EMS) personnel traditionally waited until a scene was secure 
before they rendered aid to shooting victims.103 However, many lessons learned from the 
Aurora, Colorado, theater shootings saw that fire was not prepared to treat victims in 
unsecured areas. First responders were caught off-guard with the shooting scene that 
encompassed 58 shooting victims and another 12 who had been murdered.104 Fire and 
police began to coordinate better response tactics to treat mass casualty victims in areas 
that were not completely secure, called the “warm zone.”105 As a result of this cultural 
change within law enforcement and the fire service, first responders developed a sense of 
duty to protect active shooting victims and a willingness to sacrifice themselves instead of 
waiting for additional resources to address the situation. 
2. Phases of an Active Shooter Attack  
Understanding why a person decides to commit an act of violence can be 
challenging, and it can be more difficult to identify precursors of a violent path. Law 
enforcement experts have delineated phases of an active shooter attack to help investigators 
understand the process a suspect goes through in preparation for a targeted attack. Police 
Lieutenant Marcou’s theory describes five phases that most active shooters go through 
upon choosing a target, including the fantasy, planning, preparation, approach, and 
implementation phases.106 He contends that intervention is possible if officers can 
recognize what phase a suspect is in and then allocate the proper resources to stop an attack 
before the suspect passes to the next phase.107 Intervention is a critical element in 
preventing future attacks. However, at times, some experts combine or omit phases from 
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the process. By compartmentalizing each phase, as opposed to combining them, the 
concepts can assist officers in identifying a potential suspect, as each phase is specific to 
the outcome of an eventual attack. 
The first phase in the active shooter continuum is the fantasy phase. In this phase, 
the potential suspect begins to daydream and fantasize about conducting a mass 
shooting.108 Said suspect may share thoughts or feelings with other people or may write 
down a plan in a journal, notebook, or social media posting. Marcou believes it is a good 
time during this stage for witnesses to notify authorities or mental health professionals to 
intervene and get the would-be attackers help. He states that one of the biggest mistakes 
people make is dismissing the warning signs as “crazy talk” and thinking they are not 
serious about hurting anyone.109 An FBI study conducted from 2000 to 2013 found that 
100 percent of witnesses who knew an active shooter suspect recognized at least one 
concerning behavior prior to the shooting, but only reported the incident 41 percent of the 
time.110  
In the planning phase, a suspect begins to outline the “who, what, when, where, 
why, and how” of the attack.111 At times, suspects leave manifestos, as was the case in the 
Virginia Tech shooter, who recorded a video of himself and sent it to several news stations 
outlining why he was angry and whom he blamed.112 They also pick a targeted location 
and outline a plan for dealing with several barriers they may encounter along the way that 
will hamper their goal of committing the attack. Shooters often plan their routes or take the 
time to conduct surveillance on a specific location, and in the past, have even sought 
accomplices during the planning phase to increase their odds of a successful attack. 
Investigators can learn significant details from people if they interview them in the 
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planning phase. At times, the suspects may willingly divulge their true intentions and 
accept assistance from mental health professionals.  
The preparation phase occurs when the perpetrators begin to gather all the tools and 
equipment needed to commit the attack.113 These items may include firearms, ammunition, 
clothing, and anything they believe may increase their chances of having a successful 
outcome. In fact, it is common for them to scout the location ahead of time to ensure they 
have contingency plans in place should something change. During the preparation phase, 
Marcou believes it is vital for business owners to alert authorities if they witness suspicious 
activity.114 According to the LVMPD Criminal Investigative Report of the 1 October Mass 
Casualty Shooting, which reported on the Las Vegas shooting, the suspect had so many 
pieces of luggage that he brought with him to the Mandalay Bay hotel that hotel staff 
assisted him with his belongings.115 It was believed that he used the luggage to transport 
his firearms and ammunition. Paddock was also very particular about not allowing anyone 
into his room, even denying housekeeping services during his entire stay.116 Such strange 
behavior should have been reported either to security or to the police department. 
Investigators must, in turn, do their due diligence by following up potential leads. Small 
pieces of information may seem irrelevant if examined individually, but combined with 
other sources of intelligence, may be important.  
In the approach phase, the suspect is advancing toward the targeted area, prepared 
for an attack, and at this point, a school’s level of preparedness becomes evident. Schools 
often focus on the approach phase, and use law enforcement or security personnel to help 
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harden their facilities.117 These site assessments usually consist of recommendations for 
additional fencing, security cameras, or procedures to control access to certain facilities. 
Hardening a facility can act as a deterrent and force the suspect to reconsider the target 
location or minimize injuries due to improved security features. During the approach phase, 
the suspect may decide to defeat various security features or ignore them completely. 
According to the Virginia Tech after-action report, the suspect chained the entrance doors, 
which led to a delay in law enforcement stopping the threat and administering first aid to 
the victims.118 The adaptability of active shooter suspects is one reason officials have made 
the approach phase and hardening their locations a priority.  
The last stage in Marcou’s active shooter process is the implementation phase, 
which is when the shooter actively shoots and kills innocent people. The suspect’s primary 
goal is to obtain a high number of victims, and the only thing the suspect is focused on is 
shooting as many “targets” as possible.119 At this point, the only ways to stop the attack is 
by outside intervention, such as a law enforcement officer or a Good Samaritan, or if the 
shooter surrenders, flees, or commits suicide. In a study conducted by Adam Lankford to 
determine the likelihood of negotiating with a mass murderer, he concluded that from 
1966–2010, 48 percent for active shooters committed suicide or initiated a suicide by 
cop.120 Some officials believe any negotiation with an active shooter is futile because the 
suspect has spent so much time mentally preparing for the attack that the shooter is beyond 
the point of intervention. In 2015, a husband–wife active shooter duo shot several people 
in a San Bernardino county building during a training seminar and then fled the scene.121 
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Officers discovered their vehicle and later killed the suspects after a gun battle. This 
example shows the suspects making the decision to flee the initial scene and not 
surrendering when confronted. It illustrates the active shooter’s mindset, and why experts 
believe negotiating with an active shooter is futile.  
As shown in Figure 1, Marcou’s five-phase active shooter process is widely seen 
in law enforcement publications, but other experts have added elements to the active 
shooter attack phases. For instance, Sinai adds two phases in his book, one at the beginning 
and one at the end of the process. The first phase he labels “triggers,” explaining why the 
suspects feel compelled to commit these attacks.122 The last phase he terms “responding 
to active shooters,” which entails law enforcement’s actions during and after an 
incident.123 Sinai’s phase two is referred to as “cognitive opening: the mindset and 
behaviors phase” instead of the fantasy phase but includes many of the same behaviors. 
Adding too many phases may seem to convolute the goal of law enforcement having a 
quick reference guide, but in this case, Sinai simply includes information that complements 
most research about the topics, as well as Marcou’s work.  
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Figure 1. Dan Marcou’s Five Phases of the Active Shooter.124 
The phases of an active shooter attack were established to help first responders 
identify a person in crisis and mobilize resources as needed. Most of the concepts related 
to early detection are well established, and most can be found in early research by experts 
working with the USSS. However, the stages help law enforcement recognize certain 
patterns of behaviors on which investigators can act. To understand the gaps in tracking 
potential active shooter threats, this research set out to identify the tools law enforcement 
has at its disposal and the type of training officers receive. Marcou’s stages pinpoint 
possible behavioral patterns or triggers in a suspect’s life during different stages that may 
forecast future threats. Once law enforcement identifies that point, investigators can gauge 
whether a person needs immediate intervention or future monitoring. 
3. Threat Assessments  
Since the Columbine High School shooting in 1999, the United States has seen a 
rise in active shooter incidents. According to a 2019 FBI study, the United States had 277 
active shooter incidents from 2000 to 2018 that resulted in 884 people killed and 1,546 
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wounded.125 As the number of incidents has risen, law enforcement has started looking for 
ways to prevent attacks and turned to threat assessments as a means to supplement other 
prevention measures. The threat assessment is a tool that the public and private sectors use 
to assess whether the shooters are a threat to their immediate environments or a specific 
location. The threat assessment model is an investigative tool developed by the USSS to 
assess threats against the president of the United States.126 Mental health professionals 
later modified it to evaluate school threats.127 As workplace violence began to increase, 
the private sector also saw a need to develop its own threat assessment teams. The process 
uses specific behaviors commonly exhibited by past active shooters to identify whether a 
person is a threat.  
The foundation for threat assessments was established by a study sponsored by the 
USSS in the mid-1990s. Conducted by forensic psychiatrist Robert Fein and United States 
Special Agent Bryan Vossekuil, the study examined the behaviors and thought patterns of 
individuals before they carried out targeted attacks.128 The study, known as the Secret 
Service Exceptional Case Study Project (ECSP), looked at 83 suspects who carried out or 
attempted a violent attack on a public figure.129 Researchers determined that most of the 
individuals made the decision to launch an attack after a life-changing crisis, and they 
began to see assassination as “acceptable.”130 Fein and Vossekuil also concluded that most 
suspects sought fame from the attacks, and suspects even conducted research on prior 
assassination attempts.131 The behaviors are worth noting as some of the same 
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characteristics materialize in active shooter threat assessments. Early behavioral 
characteristics are indicated in Table 1.  
Table 1. Concerning Behaviors Exhibited by Most Targeted Threats: 
Suspects and Active Shooter Suspects.132  
Concerning Behaviors Suspects threatening 
Public Officials 
Active Shooter Suspects 
Described as social isolates 
or loners 
X X 
History of harassing others X X 
Anger issues X X 
No extensive criminal 
history  
X X 
Interest in radial groups X X 
History of depression X X 
Past suicide attempts X X 
Past contact with mental 
health professionals 
X X 




Fein and Vossekuil’s 1998 report applies their previous work to help local law 
enforcement with a framework in identifying threats to public figures.133 The guide was 
published just a year before the Columbine High School shooting and provided law 
enforcement with a baseline for threat assessment investigations. They describe threat 
assessments, or “protective intelligence,” as the process of gathering information about 
individuals who have an interest in harming others and gauge their potential to act on their 
motives.134 The guidelines offer law enforcement a detailed foundation of what threat 
assessment investigations should look like and how to manage that intelligence. 
Additionally, it gives officials new to threat assessments general information for use during 
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an investigation. For example, the guide emphasizes the importance of interviews even if 
the investigator is not obtaining incriminating statements. The researchers stress the 
importance of examining the efforts and steps a subject has taken to prepare for an attack 
and not being consumed by a lack of evidence.135 They argue that an investigation should 
focus on prevention rather than arresting a potential suspect. Moreover, the guideline 
emphasizes the need for investigators to err on the side of safety and prevention if law 
enforcement is confronted with convoluted facts. In such cases, investigators may choose 
to arrest or detain subjects to remove them from triggering events and the mobilization of 
additional resources.136  
Threat assessments examine life-changing events for individuals, known as 
stressors, as shown in Table 2. These events might make the individuals susceptible to 
stress, which causes them to act on violent impulses.137 The triggering behaviors are 
crucial in understanding whether people are showing signs of violence or are simply 
venting out of frustration. If individuals are thought to be a threat, investigators should 
meet with them to conduct interviews. By asking questions related to life-changing events, 
gathering information about their behaviors, and assessing past incidents, investigators can 
determine whether they are in crisis.138 When used with other preventive measures, threat 
assessments could help reduce active shooter incidents.  
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Table 2. 2018 FBI Study of 63 Active Shooter Cases from 2000–2013: 
Stressors Exhibited by Active Shooter Suspects.139 
Can Include More than One 
 
One of the indicators that all active shooters exhibit before an attack is a stressful 
situation, or “stressor.”140 A stressor is any life-altering incident that causes a high level 
of stress and may require emotional support.141 Examples of stressors include mental 
health issues, financial strain, job-related issues, social conflicts, alcohol or drug abuse, 
and loss of a loved one.142 According to a 2018 FBI study, all active shooters experience 
at least one stressor, with many “experiencing multiple stressors (an average of 3.6 separate 
stressors) in the year before they attacked.”143 In a separate 2019 study, the USSS 
concluded that of the 35 cases it studied, 74 percent of the attackers experienced a stressor 
within one month of the attack, and 51 percent of suspects experienced a stressor within 
                                                 
139 Source: Silver, Simons, and Craun, A Study of the Pre-Attack Behaviors, 16. 
140 Silver, Simons, and Craun, 15. 
141 United States Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center, Protecting America’s Schools, 
31. 
142 Silver, Simons, and Craun, A Study of the Pre-Attack Behaviors, 16. 
143 Silver, Simons, and Craun, 16. 
Stressors Number % 
Mental health 39 62 
Financial strain 31 49 
Job related 22 35 
Conflicts with friends/peers 18 29 
Martial problems 17 27 
Abuse of illicit drugs/alcohol 14 22 
Other (e.g., caregiving responsibilities) 14 22 
Conflict at school 14 22 
Physical injury 13 21 
Conflict with parents 11 18 
Conflict with other family members 10 16 
Sexual stress/frustration 8 13 
Criminal problems 7 11 
Civil problems 6 10 
Death of friend/relative 4 6 
None 1 1 
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two days of an attack.144 These vital pieces of information could give officials an indicator 
of what might motivate an individual to conduct a violent attack.  
As seen in Table 3, a secondary consideration for assessing an individual is the 
behavioral patterns leading up to an attack, known as “concerning behaviors.”145 A 
subject’s behavior is vital to a threat assessment investigation in determining whether a 
person is a threat. Some of the changes in behavior may include threats to others, intense 
anger, an interest in weapons, depression, changes in appearance, a suicide attempt or self-
harm, and an interest in violence.146 According to the 2019 USSS study, of the incidents 
researched, 75 percent of the attackers displayed a concerning behavior within two days of 
an attack. The most concerning behavior manifested in direct communication from the 
suspect was that 89 percent of the attackers told someone they were planning an attack.147 
The FBI concluded that in 83 percent of case studies, the suspects told someone of their 
plans to conduct an attack, but that person did not take any action.148 Experts concluded 
that people display these mannerisms for any number of reasons, and people should not 
jump to conclusions if a person exhibits one or more concerning behaviors. However, 
knowing what patterns of behavior are common among most active shooters is crucial to 
conducting a threat assessment investigation and possibly preventing an attack.  
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Table 3. 2018 FBI Study of 63 Active Shooter Cases from 2000–2013: 
Concerning Behaviors Displayed by Active Shooter Suspects.149 
Concerning Behaviors Number % 
Mental Health 39 62 
Interpersonal interactions 36 57 
Leakage 35 56 
Quality of thinking or communications 34 54 
Work performance 11 46 
School performance 5 42 
Threats/confrontations 22 35 
Anger 21 33 
Physical aggression 21 33 
Risk-taking 13 21 
Firearm behavior 13 21 
Violent media usage 12 19 
Weight/eating 8 13 
Drug abuse 8 13 
Impulsivity 7 11 
Alcohol abuse 6 10 
Physical health 6 10 
Other (e.g., idolizing criminals) 5 8 
Sexual behavior 4 6 
Quality of sleep 3 5 
Hygiene/appearance 2 3 
Can Include More Than One 
 
Another indicator that a person may turn to violence is assessing an individual’s 
primary grievance, or a person’s perception of having been wronged or unfairly treated, as 
demonstrated in Table 4.150 Understanding a person’s grievance helps investigators 
determine how dangerous this person can be, and the resources necessary to intervene and 
mitigate an attack. In a 2018 FBI study, they concluded that of the 50 active shooter 
suspects they identified, 22 of the suspects had an identifiable grievance, and most had a 
precipitating event, where a stressor aggravated the grievance.151 Threat assessments can 
help narrow the scope of the grievance that the potential suspect is focused on, and help 
investigators understand how they can best help the individual.  
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Table 4. 2018 FBI Study of 63 Active Shooter Cases from 2000–2013: 
Primary Grievance by Active Shooter Suspects.152 
Primary Grievance Number % 
Adverse interpersonal action against 
the shooter 
39 62 
Financial Strain 31 49 
Job related 22 35 
Conflicts with friends/peers 18 29 
Martial problems 17 27 
Abuse of illicit drugs/alcohol 14 22 
Other (e.g., caregiving responsibilities) 14 22 
Conflict at school 14 22 
Physical injury 13 21 
Conflict with parents 11 18 
Conflict with other family members 10 16 
Sexual stress/frustration 8 13 
Criminal problems 7 11 
Civil problems 6 10 
Death of friend/relative 4 6 
None 1 1 
Can Include More Than One 
 
The value of threat assessments is evident as more public and private entities begin 
to employ the different techniques taught to spot a potential attacker. It is not uncommon 
for companies to establish threat assessment teams at their level to address specific threats 
and then determine whether they require police intervention. In their book, Threat 
Assessment Management: Howlers and Hunters, Frank Calhoun and Stephen Weston 
differentiate a dangerous individual from someone who is not a threat but enjoys harassing 
people.153 They stress that the difference between the two is that the “hunter” wants to hurt 
and kill people while the “howler” finds pleasure in embarrassing or disrupting a person’s 
daily life.154 After the Virginia Tech shooting in 2009, the state of Virginia conducted a 
study on prevention efforts and concluded that threat assessment teams are vital to active 
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shooter prevention on college campuses.155 The research outlines essential responsibilities, 
team structure, the goals of the organization, and notification procedures.156 It is evident 
in both examples that officials see value in threat assessments and continue to find ways to 
take on additional responsibilities to assist with prevention efforts.  
C. SUMMARY 
Law enforcement has gleaned significant information from previous active shooter 
attacks, but initially, it focused on the law enforcement’s immediate response to the threat 
as opposed to addressing prevention efforts. The main reason for this focus is because 
training standards are usually set by each state’s training standards.157 Additionally, 
experts usually gravitate towards training concepts they know and understand, which is a 
simple concept adopted by most instructors because as Therese Huston points out, most 
people, regardless of profession, believe that to teach well, it is necessary to know the 
material and have mastered it.158 Furthermore, teaching law enforcement tactics and 
techniques to improve an emergency response is something that can be measured, in 
contrast to assessments. Only after the USSS or other active shooter experts conducted 
studies did the focus become more about recognizing the early warning signs. 
Unfortunately, following a tragedy, such as a targeted attack, law enforcement and mental 
health experts are usually criticized for not doing enough to prevent the attack. 
Understanding how to improve an active shooter response and conduct in-depth threat 
assessment investigations is important to assist law enforcement in mitigating attacks, 
preventing a loss of life, and minimizing serious injuries. However, as incidents continue 
to occur, people may ponder whether resources are lacking to address gaps in prevention. 
If they are, experts must try to close the gaps or find ways to bypass them using other 
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techniques. These techniques may involve tracking potential suspects, using unorthodox 
intelligence resources, or improving intelligence sharing. The next chapter examines gaps 
in prevention efforts through the examination of four different case studies. Each case study 
presents law enforcement with its own challenges, and reveals mistakes made during 
crucial points in the investigations. The lessons learned in each case study help to determine 
the scope and viability of preventing future attacks given similar circumstances.  
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III. GAPS IN PREVENTION PROCEDURES 
Read any news article after an active shooter attack, and the title or subtitle will 
include the phrase “what we know.”159 The articles usually describe the shooting, depict 
stories of heroism, and detail the tragedies of loved ones lost to a senseless act of violence. 
The story then shifts to the suspect’s past behavior, prior law enforcement contacts, and 
missed red flags. Little leeway is given to public agencies, including schools, mental health 
professionals, and especially law enforcement, if they missed intervention opportunities. 
This chapter examines gaps in active shooter prevention from the research gathered in this 
study. These disparities appear in different stages in the assessment process but have 
proven relevant in prevention efforts.  
This chapter comprises three parts. The first describes issues when officers 
investigate an individual who has threatened to commit a mass shooting. Through their 
investigation, officers determine they do not have enough probable cause to arrest or place 
the individual on a mental health hold and have limited options. The second section 
addresses the intervention techniques available to people arrested or committed to a mental 
health facility after making targeted threats. The third examines four different case studies 
and categorizes them as follows: 
1. intervention was probable, and prevention likely 
2. intervention was probable, but prevention unlikely 
3. intervention was not probable, but prevention doubtful 
This chapter does not dissect every lesson learned from the four incidents but 
highlights possible prevention options for future investigations. It also emphasizes gaps 
where additional training may have assisted with mobilizing intervention resources.  
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A. SUSPICIOUS BEHAVIOR IS NOT A CRIME 
Law enforcement has a difficult job when called to assess a person acting 
suspiciously or making vague threats. Officials are bound by law and policy when 
investigating threats cases but are also influenced by lessons learned from prior cases. 
However, at times, the investigations can become convoluted based on new trends, such as 
after-action reviews determining investigators are missing obvious red flags during 
targeted threats calls, or scrutiny by the public for not doing more to prevent an attack, that 
officers may feel compelled to arrest a suspect to keep the public safe.  
Some departments across the country have chosen to err on the side of caution, as 
described in the USSS Protective Intelligence & Threat Assessment Investigations 
guideline and make an arrest in the name of public safety.160 While the courts may find 
such an arrest lawful, arresting someone for making threats only temporarily solves the 
problem. A long-term mitigation process may be needed, but if an agency has no procedure 
established, then stakeholders may lose a chance to intercede and help a person in crisis. 
Additionally, while law enforcement may take the initial targeted threats calls serious, 
agencies must think beyond the initial response. In February 2020, a person posted a music 
video threatening two schools in Sonoma, California. Sonoma Valley School District 
officials contacted the Sonoma Police Department, which launched a full investigation.161 
Investigators located the juvenile suspected of posting the video at his residence and 
determined the threat was not credible. Additional officers staged at the schools returned 
to their regular duties, and the schools were allowed to open. School threats have seen a 
steady increase since the Parkland shooting in 2018, and such scenarios raise the question 
of what happens to the children after law enforcement has closed the case.162  
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Schools have a long history of attempting to resolve issues before they become 
criminal in nature. In some instances, the schools discipline the student for making threats 
or give the child additional help in the form of school counseling.163 Some school districts 
have threat assessment teams to examine students and refer resources to help them deal 
with the root causes behind the threats.164 Unfortunately, some school districts may have 
a process to deal with student threats, but improperly trained individuals, or lack a program 
all together. In the case of the Parkland Shooting, the school district had procedures 
established, but was inconsistent with threat assessment protocols. In one instance, the 
school conducted a full assessment but fell short of monitoring the shooter’s progress or 
lack thereof.165 With no one to track his progress properly, significant gaps in violence 
mitigation occurred. While prevention measures from school resources may help, in some 
cases, law enforcement is missing from these intervention techniques. One explanation is 
because schools may not believe the perceived threat is a crime. Unfortunately, if the case 
goes unreported, investigators may never have contact with the individuals unless they are 
involved in another criminal case. Once the student decides to move to another school or 
jurisdiction, the student’s whereabouts may go undetected by law enforcement, which 
results in the existence of a significant information-sharing gap.  
The ability to share information does come with restrictions. Without legal 
justification to pass on intelligence, such as a criminal investigation, information sharing 
is restricted to law enforcement on a need-to-know basis.166 An agency can maintain 
internal intelligence files but cannot share the information with outside agencies. However, 
attempting to follow up with intervention resources is not an option if schools fail to notify 
law enforcement of any threatening behavior. Additionally, tracking or monitoring a 
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student’s movement is impossible if law enforcement is not aware of any pending 
problems.  
B. ARRESTING AWAY THE PROBLEM 
Gaps in prevention efforts also apply to non-criminal offenses and may be among 
the most frustrating issues that face law enforcement officials when responding to targeted 
threats cases. In many ways, the pressures of trying to prevent the next active shooter may 
weigh more on the shoulders of police than any other organization when no crime has 
occurred, but the circumstances surrounding a call may be too disturbing to dismiss. One 
option is to develop enough probable cause to arrest a suspect or commit this person to a 
mental health facility. However, incarceration or mental health confinement is often a 
short-term solution to a long-term problem. It can give the public some relief, but critics 
do not believe it prevents a subject from committing future acts of violence.167 Without 
intervention procedures in place, underlying issues—feelings of rejection, harassment at 
work, or animosity toward a specific group—may not find resolution without professional 
help.168 Additionally, absent additional calls for police to investigate the individual in 
another criminal matter, law enforcement may never contact the suspect again. Without 
establishing mitigation techniques, that gap in time is sufficient for a suspect to progress 
through the five active shooter phases, as discussed in Chapter II.  
Since the Parkland incident, law enforcement has seen an increase in arrests 
associated with targeted threat cases.169 In 2019, the United States saw an increase in 
suspects arrested for making threats to commit mass shootings. Less than three weeks after 
the El Paso Walmart shooting in August 2019, law enforcement arrested 28 people in the 
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United States for making threats of mass violence, according to the BBC.170 The FBI 
reported that in this same three-week period, it received a 70 percent increase in tips 
warning of potential mass shootings.171 In an article for the Insider, Michelle Mark claims 
experts believe police are trying to make up for the lack of prevention procedures by 
arresting people to solve the problem.172 However, these techniques rarely get to the root 
of the problem and further complicate the issue by giving the public a false sense of 
security. In both the Odessa/Midland shooting and the Virginia Tech incident, the suspects 
had prior police contacts. Law enforcement believed it did everything it could within the 
constraints of the law but were still unable to prevent the attacks. In numerous cases, gaps 
seem to materialize after law enforcement encounters the potential suspect, and the case is 
turned over for prosecution or referred for a mental health evaluation. These gaps often 
consist of issues that the individual was trying to cope with at the time of the investigation, 
and later developed into stressors that triggered a violent response.173  
One way to help close gaps in active shooter prevention is for law enforcement to 
track or monitor a suspect after the police have completed their investigation. In rare cases, 
investigators continue to monitor a suspect’s activity to ensure this person is not a threat to 
the public. A common method is to establish threat assessment teams consisting of law 
enforcement, mental health professionals, and school officials that meet and discuss 
resources to help individuals in crises.174 While these teams can be useful for helping 
people in a specific area, if they move out of the region or are to a jurisdiction that does 
not have similar procedures in place, they may go undetected.  
Trying to arrest-away any problem seldom works in law enforcement, and most 
experts agree that to have a positive effect, potential subjects need additional prevention 
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measures. In most cases, arresting a potential suspect or placing a person on a mental health 
hold allows law enforcement the time to mobilize supplementary resources and develop an 
intervention plan. However, in some cases, the plan lacks follow-through. Officials do not 
think beyond taking a suspect into custody, and they often see the removal of an individual 
from the environment as a success. Furthermore, since Columbine, law enforcement 
agencies have begun to consider methods beyond an arrest or mental health hold, as 
recommended by after-action reviews and documents focused on school safety. For 
example, one USSS guidebook suggested three key components to a threat management 
strategy that included: 1) controlling/containing the situation, 2) protecting and aiding 
possible targets, and 3) providing support and guidance to help the suspected student 
resolve any issues.175 As described in the publication, detainment is but one part of a 
broader solution. In addition, some experts argue that individuals who exhibit concerning 
behaviors should be monitored until stakeholders agree a subject is no longer in crisis. Until 
that point, law enforcement should track the subject’s progress, and not underestimate the 
possibility of committing future acts of violence.176 
C. CASE STUDIES 
This section analyzes mass shootings after the Columbine incident to gauge existing 
gaps in law enforcement prevention efforts. The case studies were selected based on the 
relationships between stakeholders and the challenges confronting officials at the time of 
the investigation. The research sought to determine whether monitoring programs or 
information sharing increased or decreased active shooter prevention efforts. The incidents 
used to contribute to this section include the MSD shooting, or Parkland incident; the 
Virginia Tech shooting; the Odessa-Midland shooting; and the Las Vegas Route 91 
shooting. Each distinct case study is categorized as one of three incident types: 1) 
intervention techniques were probable and prevention likely, 2) intervention techniques 
were possible, but prevention unlikely, or 3) intervention techniques were improbable and 
prevention doubtful. The case studies comprise an overview of each incident, the suspect’s 
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background and concerning behaviors, law enforcement contacts, mental health history, 
and gaps with intervention efforts. Although the case studies focus on gaps in the initial 
investigation, some also analyze concerning behaviors or stressors missed during the 
investigation. Additionally, a few incidents highlight police efforts that exceed standard 
operating procedures, such as the Odessa-Midland shooting, to magnify their concerns of 
suspect behavior and show the gap between police instinct and operating within the 
confines of the law. Furthermore, this study does not intend to degrade any efforts made 
by the primary law enforcement agencies tasked with the investigation or responsible for 
helping communities heal after each tragedy. The goal is to analyze the resources each 
department had available to it at the time of the initial investigation and the disparities that 
contributed to the events.  
1. Marjory Stoneman Douglas: Intervention Probable, Prevention 
Likely 
The MSD High School shooting, also known as the Parkland incident, was one of 
the most controversial shootings since the Columbine incident, as it calls into question 
missed red flags from several officers and school administrators. The incident highlights 
several lessons for both law enforcement and school officials when responding to targeted 
threats calls or conducting in-house threat assessments. Several political stances reemerged 
from red flag laws to the debate over guns, but this study does not focus on those issues. 
Instead, this research focuses on the early warning signs and concerning behaviors 
observed by those closest to the suspect. This case study also examines the intervention 
techniques available to law enforcement and if those resources may have prevented the 
attack. Unfortunately, this case is categorized as an incident where intervention was 
probable and prevention likely. 
a. The Attack 
On February 14, 2018, Nicolas Cruz ordered a ride via his mobile ridesharing app 
and set the destination for MSD High School. He entered the vehicle armed with an assault 
rifle and magazine-carrying vest. At 2:19 p.m., Cruz arrived at the school and entered 
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building 12, commonly referred to as the Freshman building.177 As he entered the building, 
he paused by the east stairway on the first floor, loaded a semi-automatic rifle, and put on 
the vest. He immediately encountered a male student and told him to leave because 
“something bad was going to happen.”178 The student ran out of the building and did notify 
someone, but a delay occurred. Then, Cruz entered the first floor to building 12, began 
randomly shooting, and showed no preference in his intended targets. He continued to the 
second and third floors, shooting victims as they ran into classrooms, hid behind desks, or 
tried to escape the building.179 Cruz shot 34 people that day, killing 17 victims before 
leaving the school by blending in with students who were fleeing.180 Within minutes, all 
available officers responded to the school and located Cruz walking in a residential 
neighborhood approximately two miles from the high school campus.181  
b. Background and Concerning Behaviors 
Nikolas Cruz struggled with behavioral issues that started as a child. At the age of 
two, a Florida couple adopted Cruz and his younger brother.182 His mother stayed home, 
and his father worked in real estate.183 Neighbors reported having several run-ins with 
Cruz when he was growing up, but every time they tried to speak with his mother about 
the incidents, she protected him. At 12, Cruz lost his father to a heart attack, and his mother 
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was left to raise both boys on her own.184 Some neighbors recount witnessing him torture 
small animals and vandalize property without provocation. Others remember damaged 
furniture hauled away every few months and police being called to Cruz’s residence to 
resolve disturbances. People described Cruz as an emotionally troubled individual who had 
a quick temper and a habit of posting disturbing social media posts. As Cruz entered his 
teenage years, he seemed withdrawn from people, and some students said they were afraid 
of him.185  
Witnesses claim that the only stable part of his life was his mother. She tried to 
provide for her sons the best that she could, and at times, seemed overprotective. Friends 
of his mother believed she was afraid of him, and one family member claimed Cruz 
assaulted her during one of his outbursts and knocked out some of her teeth.186 In 
November 2018, Cruz’s mother died of pneumonia, so he moved in with family friends. 
They helped him get a job and allowed him to stay with them, but Cruz sank into 
depression.187 He was active on Instagram, with one person he conversed with over the 
platform saying Cruz was angry at school and consistently bullied. Cruz’s contact claimed 
the youth had talked about shooting up his school and even fantasized about committing 
suicide.188 
c. Law Enforcement Contacts 
As a juvenile, Cruz had a long history with law enforcement contacts. According 
to the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission Report, from 
the time Cruz was three years old until a month before the MSD shooting, investigators 
had found 69 documented incidents where he threatened someone, engaged in violence, or 
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displayed other concerning behaviors.189 The report found that the Broward County 
Sheriff’s Office had investigated Cruz 21 times for minor offenses, but most did not involve 
criminal activity that included an arrest. After the shooting, the sheriff’s office opened an 
Internal Affair’s investigation that uncovered two incidents in which deputies failed to 
“properly investigate” a call. At the conclusion of both investigations, the deputies received 
disciplinary action.190 The commission also concluded that at least 30 people had concerns 
about Cruz’s behavior, and at least six claimed they notified school officials, some citing 
fears of Cruz becoming the next school shooter.191 During a nine-year period, he “received 
hundreds of hours of therapy sessions,” and at one point, school officials conducted a threat 
assessment.192 After the assessment, officials determined that Cruz “did not meet the 
criteria for an involuntary examination,” which meant they could not commit him without 
his permission.193  
d. Gaps 
The Parkland incident revealed gaps in information sharing and follow-through 
among the existing threat assessment process. This incident falls in the intervention 
probable and techniques likely category because the investigation uncovered several 
incidents in which both law enforcement and school officials were notified of concerning 
behaviors but fell short of completing the investigation. Moreover, the lack of follow-
through prevented stakeholders from mobilizing resources and helping Cruz or mitigating 
an attack against the school. Interviews conducted by investigators uncovered 30 people 
who had witnessed Cruz’s concerning behavior but did not report the incidents or who did 
report them, but nothing was done to address their concerns. Also, Cruz made suicidal 
comments via social media, but no one came forward to report the postings. Finally, 
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aggressive behavior toward his mother mostly went unreported, although several friends 
and neighbors believed she was terrified of him.194 The MSD final report, and other 
relevant sources to this case study, did not address how much training the Broward County 
Sheriff’s Office received in threat assessment investigations, or whether additional training 
could have helped prevent the incident. Knowing if field officers received training in 
recognizing potential red flag or concerning behaviors would help explain any gaps 
exposed by the initial investigation or lack of proper notification.  
A breakdown in communication and a lack of information sharing also contributed 
to gaps in threat mitigation. Between the Broward County Sheriff’s Office and the Broward 
County Public School District, officials uncovered 91 documented incidents, 21 with law 
enforcement contacts, and 70 with the school district.195 Information sharing between the 
school district and law enforcement could have helped mobilize intervention resources. It 
might not have prevented the tragedy, but it could have mobilized stakeholders to help 
Cruz deal with his behavioral issues.  
2. Virginia Tech Shooting: Intervention Techniques Probable, but 
Prevention Unlikely 
The Virginia Tech case study examines the transitional period of a potential active 
shooter between an individual’s teenage years and adulthood. The research highlights how 
a strong support system can mitigate an individual on the cusp of exhibiting concerning 
behaviors and the impact that an intervention process can have on a student. Unfortunately, 
the Virginia Tech shooting also magnifies the importance of information sharing and the 
implications of removing resources prematurely from a person in crisis. The research 
uncovered many instances in which individuals raised concerns about the shooter, but 
regrettably, some important information was never passed on. Alas, the incident is 
classified as one where intervention was probable, but prevention was unlikely. 
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a. The Attack  
On the morning of April 16, 2007, Seung Cho entered the West Ambler Johnson 
Dormitory located at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia 
Tech) and killed a female student and a resident advisor. Both were shot at close range, 
and later pronounced dead. Investigators found no connection between the female student 
and Cho. Moreover, law enforcement believes that the resident advisor tried to intervene 
when he heard commotion coming from the student’s room.196 Cho then went to his dorm, 
deleted his e-mails, and disposed of his computer’s hard drive and his cell phone. Next, he 
mailed a package to NBC News in New York City containing videos, photos, and letters 
explaining his motives.197  
Cho then went to Norris Hall, well prepared to carry out his attack. He had two 
handguns, over 400 rounds of ammunition, chains, and a hammer. He chained the double 
doors to all three entrance points and left a handwritten note on one of doors warning that 
if the chains were removed, a bomb would explode.198 He proceeded down the hallways 
and looked into some of the classrooms.199 At 9:40 a.m., Cho walked into room 206, where 
engineering students were learning about advanced hydrology, shot and killed the 
instructor, and continued shooting indiscriminately. According to the Virginia Tech after-
action report, witnesses claim that Cho never said a word and did not appear to target 
anyone specifically. Cho launched attacks in five classrooms, killing 30 people and 
shooting another 17 in less than 12 minutes.200 
Most of the attacks occurred from within the entrance leading into the classrooms, 
but Cho also walked up and down the aisles and shot people at close range. He occasionally 
returned to the same classrooms and shot people as they lay injured. On two separate 
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occasions, students and faculty used their bodies to barricade the doors closed to keep Cho 
from entering. Injured and uninjured students from room 207 used their feet to keep the 
door closed and remained low as Cho shot through the door. He eventually stopped trying 
to enter and moved on to another classroom. Engineering professor Liviu Librescu in room 
204 used his body to barricade the door closed and yelled at students to jump out the 
window while Cho tried to force his way in. Sixteen students escaped room 207 before 
Librescu was fatally shot through the door, which enabled Cho to enter the classroom 
where he shot four students, killing one.201 He ultimately ended his attack on his own terms 
and committed suicide with a self-inflicted gunshot wound to the head. Investigators 
located 17 empty handgun magazines, 203 live bullets, and two handguns. Officials believe 
he stopped his attack once he heard law enforcement was drawing close.  
At the conclusion of the ordeal, investigators combed his past for any signs of 
concerning behaviors that were obvious red flags. Several case studies have explored Cho’s 
path to violence or the breakdown in communication between mental health professionals 
and the university. However, what is most intriguing about this case is the early 
intervention that Cho was provided. As officials began to investigate his childhood, they 
found that his parents worked hard with school officials to provide a strong support system. 
He was given space to be himself but was given assistance to help with his emotional 
issues. The support he received during his early years helped stabilize Cho, but once he left 
for college, he soon found himself lacking the same type of assistance. 
b. Background and Concerning Behaviors 
Apart from immigrating to the United States at a young age, Cho appeared to have 
lived a normal childhood. He was born in South Korea but immigrated to the United States 
when he was eight years old. As a child, he was extremely shy and had a difficult time 
expressing himself. For a South Korean child, having quiet and calm traits are desired 
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characteristics, but his lack of communication was concerning to his parents.202 According 
to authors Aradhana Bela Sood and Robert Cohen, his parents recognized that he was a 
special needs child and worked with school officials to help Cho cope with anxiety in social 
situations. His parents worked long hours, but they made every effort to get Cho the 
assistance he needed. When he was in middle school, they began taking him to therapy 
sessions at a resource center that focused on mental health treatment, psychological 
evaluations, and testing to English-limited immigrants.203 The authors explain that for the 
Chos, seeking help for their son was unusual because of the cultural stigma that mental 
illness brings to a South Korean family. Despite the therapy sessions, Cho continued being 
withdrawn, and although he denied having suicidal thoughts, one of his therapists predicted 
that he would eventually do harm to himself or others.204 
As Cho entered his high school years, he began to show signs of concerning 
behaviors. In mid-April 1999, shortly after the Columbine murders, Cho submitted a paper 
describing the desire to follow the examples set by the Columbine shooters. The school 
contacted Ms. Cho, who then took him to a child psychiatrist. He was diagnosed with 
“mutism and major depression” and was prescribed antidepressant medication.205 Cho was 
diligent in taking his mediation, and his family noticed improvement. After a year of 
continual progress, he was taken off his medication and never prescribed anti-depressants 
again. Cho’s lack of participation in class caught the attention of his high school guidance 
counselors. When asked if he had ever been treated for mental health issues, he lied and 
denied ever seeing a therapist, but his mother later confirmed that he had.206 With the 
Chos’ permission, the school contacted his therapists, and he went through an assessment 
that later determined he was eligible to receive assistance for his emotional disability and 
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communication difficulties. He was required to attend small groups and participate in oral 
presentations to address his mutism, and teachers made accommodations to meet with him 
privately for special assistance. According to Sood and Cohen, the high school’s education 
plan helped Cho manage his social anxiety, and the added security blanket provided by his 
support system at home, added a stable environment that helped him progress through his 
teenage years.207 Unfortunately, that stability would not follow him when he left for 
Virginia Tech.  
When Cho applied to Virginia Tech, the admissions office had no idea of his 
educational accommodations or emotional issues. Cho’s IQ was above average, but Sood 
and Cohen believe his grades in high school benefited from the extra attention and 
“modifications” that he received.208 Most grades are based on class participation, but since 
the school modified certain requirements for Cho, that aspect did not reflect in his final 
grades. His guidance high school guidance counselor suggested that he attend a small 
college close to home, but he chose to attend Virginia Tech. His grades and SAT scores 
were enough for him to gain admission. At the time of his application, Virginia Tech did 
not require letters of recommendations, nor did it conduct in-person interviews.209  
Interviews with students and faculty paint Cho as a troubled individual who rarely 
spoke and to some extent tried to intimidate people. Students felt uncomfortable around 
him, and although people tried to befriend him, they were often scared off by untimely 
outbursts or awkward interactions with him.210 He was described as a disruptive student 
who wore sunglasses in class, rarely participated in class discussions, or spoke so low that 
no one could understand what he was saying. Several professors complained to their 
department chairs about his behavior. Dr. Nikki Giovanni, who taught poetry, was so 
uncomfortable with his conduct that she threatened to resign if he was not removed from 
her class. She complained that students appeared to be afraid of Cho, and she was 
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particularly disturbed with his writings. She found his work dark and disturbing, and even 
asked that a psychologist evaluate his writings.211 He was referred to the university’s Care 
Team, which focused on students with special needs, and was composed of Judicial Affairs, 
the dean of students, and the Cook Counseling Center.212 The department chair eventually 
agreed to tutor Cho privately for the remainder of the semester, but the Care Team never 
reviewed or followed up on his case.213 Cho continued attending classes. He started 
developing a reputation as someone who students and faculty were leery of having in class. 
c. Law Enforcement Contacts  
Cho had a few run-ins with law enforcement on campus but no criminal history. 
On November 27, 2005, campus police spoke to him about texting and e-mailing a female 
student using the alias “Question Mark,” and then unexpectedly went to the student’s dorm 
room and told her he was “Question Mark.” The meeting startled the student, and she 
reported the incident to a student advisor who then called police. The officers spoke with 
Cho and told him not to have any further contact with the student.214 A few weeks later, 
police contacted Cho again after another female student reported an incident that had 
occurred a few months prior where Cho was in the woman’s dorm room, produced a knife, 
and then stabbed the carpet. She had stopped socializing with him after the incident but 
was also receiving unusual e-mails from him. She went home for Thanksgiving break and 
told her father about the incident, and he decided to report it to the police. Officers spoke 
to Cho once again and told him to refrain from contacting the student. Shortly thereafter, 
he sent a text message to his suitemate and claimed that he might kill himself. The police 
were called, and he was detained for a mental health evaluation.215  
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Cho was taken to a nearby mental facility for an evaluation, but the process left 
much to be desired. He was found to have some form of mental illness but not classified 
as a danger to himself or others, a state requirement to commit someone to the facility. The 
providers there recommended that he participate in an outpatient treatment program, but 
Cho never received further treatment, nor did anyone from the facility follow up on his 
progress.216 His parents were never notified that he had been evaluated for mental health 
issues, and the university police were never advised of this recommendation for continual 
outpatient treatment. The lack of a notification procedure with law enforcement did not 
violate a statute, and because Cho was over 18, the facility was not required to contact his 
parents. For next 16 months, Cho continued his disruptive behavior, but he ceased to have 
any further contact with police. The mental health recommendations and police 
investigations were not uncovered until investigators studied his path to violence, after his 
rampage. 
c. Gaps 
The Virginia Tech incident provides insight into vulnerable gaps in a person’s life 
between the teen years and adulthood. This incident falls in the intervention techniques 
probable, but prevention unlikely category because although Cho was identified as a 
special needs child in high school, and a support system was implemented for him, that 
network did not follow him to college. The case examines the vulnerable transition from 
Cho’s life where stability was established as a child but lost when he became an adult. As 
evidenced by this case study, early childhood intervention by Cho’s parents and the school 
system helped provide Cho with the assistance he needed to deal with his emotional issues. 
Additionally, accommodations made by teachers at Cho’s high school enabled him to find 
academic success, to the point that he could continue his education at an institution of 
higher learning. However, regardless of the early intervention used to stabilize Cho, 
moving on to Virginia Tech prevented him from continuing his progress into adulthood. 
While some officials argue that intervention was probable if school officials encouraged 
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information sharing with Virginia Tech, the fact remains that no law was violated for 
failing to do so.  
The Virginia Tech after-action review cites an issue with a lack of a permanent 
record process to follow students when they transition to college and believes that public 
safety matters should be documented.217 Sharing that type of information from the onset 
could have afforded Cho crisis intervention resources, but unfortunately, some privacy 
rights restrict such flow of medical information. Without the legal authority to do so, the 
schools’ hands may have still been tied. It remains to be seen whether sharing medical 
information would help with closing that gap, but it might be worth a try. Nevertheless, 
students and faculty reported plenty of red flags while Cho attended Virginia Tech, yet 
little was done to resolve those issues. 
3. Odessa-Midland Shooting: Intervention Techniques Possible, but 
Prevention Unlikely 
The Odessa-Midland active shooting incident offers a glimpse at a case that is 
different from a traditional active shooter incident. The shooting took place over several 
locations, and the shooter was mobile the entire time. Some people noticed early warning 
signs, but it appeared that once the suspect experienced a significant triggering event, law 
enforcement had minimal time to react. This study examines the concerning behaviors 
leading up to the event and the gaps that led to the shooting. The early red flags made 
intervention possible, but the time between incidents made prevention unlikely. 
a. The Attack 
On August 31, 2019, Seth Ator was fired from his job after the owner of the 
company told him he had received numerous complaints from customers about Ator’s 
attitude. Ator became angry and made several irrational comments involving fellow 
employees involved in child pornography, and even complained about the government 
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tracking his whereabouts.218 He was not making much sense, and when his supervisor 
asked Ator for the keys to the worksite, he refused to give them back. After the automatic 
gates were closed to prevent Ator from driving off with the keys, Ator drove through the 
fencing. The company immediately called the police and explained his manic state.219 
While the case officer was on his way to Ator’s job site, he received a request via 
his police radio that Ator wanted to speak with the police.220 Ator told the officer he was 
being held against his will, forced to watch pornography, and that the company tried to 
keep him on the property by closing the gate. He referenced government conspiracies and 
claimed that he had reported these incidents in the past, but he eventually hung up after he 
believed the officer was patronizing him.221 Two Odessa police officers and two Texas 
State Troopers arrived at Ator’s job site after they learned that a person matching Ator’s 
description was seen driving erratically and displaying a rifle. A witness was able to obtain 
a vehicle license plate number that police traced back to Ator, and they prepared for a 
possible confrontation with him.222  
Within a few minutes of the broadcast, a Texas trooper conducted a traffic stop on 
the vehicle, and upon exiting his patrol car, was immediately shot. Ator continued driving 
but stopped several times to shoot people indiscriminately, at one point, shooting and 
killing a postal worker before carjacking her vehicle.223 Throughout the ordeal, he made 
no effort to stop his rampage. Police tracked Ator behind a movie theater in Odessa, and 
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he was shot and killed after exchanging gunfire with police.224 Ator shot 25 people that 
day, killing seven. The youngest person injured was a 17-month-old girl, and the oldest 
was a 64-year-old man from Clarksville, Texas. The youngest person killed was a 15-year-
old girl, and the oldest person was a 57- -year-old man. 
b. Background and Concerning Behaviors 
Seth Ator had a troubled past, but few people believed he could commit an active 
shooter attack. People felt uneasy about him, with one neighbor describing him as “El 
Loco,” Spanish for “the crazy one,” and admitting that Ator scared her.225 He was known 
as a loner, who resided in a metal shack with no electricity, with his small dog as his only 
companion. Despite not having many friends, he had a job working as a truck driver, but 
rarely did anyone from work visit him. Ator was originally from Lorena, Texas, and took 
some classes at McLennan Community College in Waco.226 A friend described him as 
quiet and reserved, who was not a bad person, but had become paranoid and angry over the 
years. Moreover, he described Ator as believing the whole world was against him, so he 
felt the attack was out of frustration as opposed to any specific motive.227  
c. Law Enforcement Contacts 
Ator had a criminal history in Texas and was also familiar with Texas mental health 
professionals. According to a CNN report, Ator had a dozen incidents with Texas law 
enforcement since 2001. Although most incidents were for minor offenses, he was known 
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to become violent when he drank alcohol.228 A close friend described him as someone who 
became aggressive when he drank and thought everyone was against him.229 Records 
obtained by the New York Post suggest that Ator was committed to a Texas mental health 
facility in 2001 and 2006.230 In 2011, the Amarillo Police Department responded to Ator’s 
residence where he was living with his mother. She reported that he was refusing to take 
his medication and had threatened to commit suicide.231 According to a CNN report, his 
mother reported he was “delusional about a government conspiracy against him” and 
warned about a police standoff. The officers discovered an underground shelter, which they 
interpreted as preparations for a standoff, and a machete hidden under his bed. They did 
not locate any firearms, but they were concerned about their encounter with Ator. Officers 
took photos of the residence and sketched a diagram of the floorplan, which they later 
shared with the SWAT team.232 Ator was detained and taken to a mental health facility for 
evaluation, and while at the facility, he told a security officer, “The police can’t be 
everywhere.”233 It appeared that he was foreshadowing what he would do eight years later. 
d. Gaps 
Law enforcement and mental health officials tried several intervention techniques 
to help Ator, but for unknown reasons, they were unsuccessful. Ator was ineligible to 
purchase or own a firearm, but he could still acquire a firearm through a private seller 
without submitting to a background check.234 Several questions remain as the investigation 
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continues, and law enforcement has not published the final report on the incident. However, 
most media outlets point to the 2011 incident where police found an underground shelter 
at his residence as a significant red flag. Ator was committed for a mental health evaluation, 
and many people wonder whether that was a point in time when police should have 
mobilized additional resources or sought to notify allied agencies. However, Amarillo 
Police Chief Ed Drain defended his agency, stating that law enforcement must follow the 
law. He argued that his department did everything it could, noting that the Constitution 
prohibits police from “locking people up” for broad criteria involving threats.235  
Chief Drain admitted that intelligence sharing played a key role in not monitoring 
Ator after the 2011 incident. He believed his department did everything it could and did 
not know what could have been done about Ator committing an attack four hours away 
from Amarillo, Texas.236 Mental health experts seem to agree with the chief’s assessment 
and feel like failed policies more than a lack of preventive resources contributed to this 
attack. For example, James Densley, a criminal justice professor at Metropolitan State 
University in St. Paul, said police need more resources to include red-flag laws to control 
access to firearms and increased partnerships with mental health experts.  
Besides moving out of Amarillo, another aspect of this case is the fact that Ator did 
not have any significant issues with Texas law enforcement or mental health professionals 
since 2011. Most experts would assume that Ator was doing well with his illness if they 
were strictly going off his criminal history or mental health records. Based on the resources 
available to law enforcement, intervention techniques might have mitigated an attack, but 
once he left the area, and remained unnoticed by not drawing attention to himself, 
prevention was unlikely. 
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4. 1 October Las Vegas Mass Casualty Shooting: Intervention 
Techniques Not Probable, Prevention Doubtful  
This case study examines an incident in which the suspect did not show signs of 
distress. Those closest to the suspect did not observe concerning behaviors, and no 
triggering events foreshadowed any acts of violence in his state of mind. With no clues to 
help prevent an attack from happening, this incident is classified as a case where 
intervention techniques were not probable and preventing the incident was unlikely. In the 
two previous case studies, law enforcement had numerous contacts with the suspects, and 
officials could point to concerning behaviors or triggering events that preceded an attack. 
However, in the case of Stephen Paddock, the 1 October shooter, investigators were unable 
to find a motive behind the attack.237 Without indicators that have been proven precursors 
to targeted violence, the public is left wondering how law enforcement might prevent 
similar tragedies in the future. 
a. The Attack 
On September 17, 2017, Stephen Paddock checked into the Ogden Hotel in Las 
Vegas and booked his stay until September 28, 2017. According to the Las Vegas 
Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD)’s criminal investigation, his stay overlapped 
with reservations at the Mandalay Bay Hotel. Paddock checked into the hotel on September 
25, 2017 and was seen moving large pieces of luggage periodically from both hotels to his 
car, and even received assistance from a bellman with his luggage. The report also states 
that a few days before the attack, Paddock deposited $14,000 into a Wells Fargo bank 
account and transferred $50,000 to a bank in the Philippines, where his girlfriend was 
visiting family at the time. Moreover, people who knew him said he continued his usual 
routine of gambling heavily and occasionally leaving the hotel. Nothing about Paddock’s 
behavior seemed odd to the staff, as he was a regular at the casinos and considered a “high-
status” player.238  
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On October 1, 2017, Paddock continued to act like a normal patron, and his 
behavior did not raise concerns. He spent much of the day gambling and ordering room 
service. Outside the Mandalay Bay Hotel, 20,000 country music fans attended the three-
day Route 91 Harvest Festival, and unbeknownst to them, Paddock’s rooms on the 32nd 
floor overlooked the event. According to investigators, at 10:05 p.m. while country singer 
Jason Aldean was on stage, Paddock began shooting into the crowd of spectators and 
continued his assault for several minutes.239 A security officer on Paddock’s floor was the 
first to hear shots coming from his room, and as he approached to investigate the noise, 
Paddock fired rounds into the hallway. A bullet fragment pierced the security officer’s leg, 
and he immediately notified his dispatcher that shots were coming from Paddock’s floor. 
Paddock then redirected his attention to the crowd and continued to fire indiscriminately 
for approximately 10 minutes.240 LVMPD officers made their way to the 32nd floor and 
made the decision to enter the room. They placed an explosive charge on the door and 
initiated an explosive breach. At 11:20 p.m., officers entered the room and reported that 
the suspect was down of an “apparent self-inflicted gunshot wound to his head.”241 After 
the attack, Paddock had killed 58 people and wounded another 869.242 
b. Background and Concerning Behaviors 
Several people were interviewed after the attack, and the consensus from those who 
knew him was disbelief that Paddock could commit such a violent attack. According to 
Paddock’s brother, Eric, Stephen was one of four children and the only sibling that kept in 
contact with him.243 The family grew up in a lower-middle-class family and lived in 
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Southern California.244 Stephen had held various federal jobs and spent time employed by 
the U.S. Postal Service, Internal Revenue Service, and the Defense Contract Audit Agency. 
In the early 1980s, he invested in real estate and eventually owned more than nine houses, 
and apartment complexes in Nevada, Florida, and California.245 As he amassed wealth, he 
began to gamble and was seen as an arrogant person. In an interview with the New York 
Times, a former casino executive described him as someone who believed everyone worked 
for him. People described Paddock as someone who knew how to gamble, and people, even 
his own family, would cater to his wishes. However, most admit that he rarely showed 
them the same affection in return.246  
c. Law Enforcement Contacts 
Paddock was not known to law enforcement and did not have an extensive criminal 
history. His youngest brother Eric depicted his other siblings as having mental disorders 
but described Paddock as a “narcissist” and someone who cared about people only if it 
benefited him.247 A spokesman from the Mesquite, Nevada, Police Department, of the 
town where Paddock resided, stated that he did not have any issues with creditors and did 
not cause any problems in town. His neighbors described him as curt and not overly 
outgoing. Still, the people who rented his apartments believed he was a good landlord who 
tended to their needs and kept their rent prices fair.248 None of the people interviewed 
noticed any concerning behaviors or triggering events that might have led them to believe 
Paddock was a danger to the public. Except for the unusual number of firearms purchased 
in a short time, he gave no warning signs for the authorities to act upon or try to intervene. 
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d. Gaps  
Investigators could not come up with a motive for the attack, and without a motive, 
family and friends of the victims were left without closure. Paddock did not leave a 
manifesto, diary, or notes explaining why he felt the need to harm all those people. In 
examining this case study, the incident falls into the category in which intervention 
techniques were not probable and prevention unlikely. Without warning signs, such as 
triggering events or concerning behaviors, it is nearly impossible for authorities or mental 
health professionals to get involved.  
This case is unique and disturbing, as investigators were left with few answers to 
many unsettling questions. With many people wanting to learn from this incident to prevent 
similar attacks from happening, it might be concluded that with few investigative leads, 
law enforcement could not have prevented this attack. Although it is true that Paddock 
bought several firearms in a short period, he did, however, have a legal right to do so in the 
state of Nevada, and his purchases did not raise any red flags. In such cases, the only 
prevention technique law enforcement has available is lessons learned from past incidents, 
which include target hardening and site assessments, advanced security measures, rapid 
response training, and mutual aid response. Law enforcement consistently trains both 
private and public employees in active shooter prevention and recognition procedures with 
the hope that the community can act as a force multiplier. Nonetheless, even with such 
training and vigilant citizenry, preventing this type of an act in the future without viable 
leads is almost impossible to predict.  
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter focused on gaps in investigative techniques currently available to law 
enforcement agencies involving targeted threats against persons or locations. The examples 
in Sections A, Section B and the case studies examined, are a sample of the scenarios law 
enforcement confronts daily. The decisions officers make regarding tracking and 
monitoring must weigh the constitutional rights of the individual with the need to protect 
the public. As the research uncovered in the various case studies, at times, law enforcement 
may do everything right and still fail to protect the public. One area that law enforcement 
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may need to focus on is monitoring or tracking of future active shooter suspects, and 
individuals whom officials believe capable of committing a mass casualty attack. Such 
methods might require unorthodox techniques but could prove valuable in adding to 
prevention measures. The following chapter introduces issues with tracking or monitoring 
potential active shooters. 
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IV. ANALYSIS: LIMITS ON MONITORING POTENTIAL 
SUSPECTS 
Several factors determine law enforcement’s ability to deter and prevent an active 
shooter attack. Some factors are self-imposed expectations built on past practices, and the 
public places some of these expectations on law enforcement.249 One way that law 
enforcement can prevent crime is by stopping suspects before they commit the act. A police 
technique that has long been in practice is monitoring suspected criminal activity over time 
with the goal of obtaining enough evidence to arrest a person or suspending a case if no 
wrongdoing is discovered. This chapter examines why law enforcement chooses not to 
monitor potential active shooter suspects once a case has gone through court proceedings, 
and any investigative gaps created through the investigative process. It analyzes why some 
law enforcement agencies are reluctant to commit resources to a tracking process and what 
may guide their decisions. This chapter is not meant to make excuses or validate decisions 
made by agencies regarding a monitoring program, or lack thereof, but to examine critically 
why gaps exist in active shooter prevention and what agencies can do in the future to help 
close those gaps.  
A. RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY  
The initial targeted threats call that an officer responds to can be challenging to 
decipher and adding to those challenges is the follow-through that comes after the initial 
investigation. Trying to determine if someone is venting, joking, or experiencing leakage 
is a tremendous amount of responsibility for law enforcement. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, law enforcement is required to base its investigative decisions on public safety and 
the constitutional rights of individuals, such as their freedom of speech and right to privacy. 
A gap exists with monitoring or tracking potential active shooters once a case is adjudicated 
or an individual is referred to mental health professionals. Some law enforcement agencies 
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have established programs to track and monitor individuals, but others may be hesitant 
since doing so can require significant resources. With law enforcement agencies 
consistently struggling with staffing issues, agencies are likely to direct resources to 
problem locations where crime reduction is measurable, such as through the Uniform 
Crime Reporting Statics or an agency’s in-house process.250 Allocating resources to a 
high-impact, low-probability event, such as a potential active shooter, may not be a priority 
in some jurisdictions.251 While the logic behind resource allocation makes sense, the gap 
left in keeping track of potential threats may not materialize until a deadly incident, which 
will likely cast a shadow on the agency.  
Some federal agencies have published recommendations for law enforcement that 
outline strategies for establishing threat programs and monitoring long-term cases. Threat 
assessment experts Fein and Vossekuil authored several guides that consistently surfaced 
throughout this research. In their research guidebook titled, Protective Intelligence & 
Threat Assessment Investigations, they focused the publication on targeted threats towards 
public officials.252 The authors provide a list of helpful characteristics for determining a 
would-be assassin’s motives, similar to the threat assessment behaviors in Chapter II. 
Additionally, the authors offer recommendations to local agencies for conducting threat 
assessments, managing threat assessment cases, and explaining that protective 
responsibility varies from one agency to another. For example, the USSS, tasked with 
protecting the president and other national leaders daily, requires more resources for their 
protective responsibility than a “smaller agency with limited or episodic protective 
responsibility.”253 However, a lack of consistent threats toward the public does not excuse 
smaller agencies from putting preventive measures in place to mitigate a deadly encounter. 
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While resource allocation may make some administrations dealing with staffing 
shortages cringe at the idea of assigning personnel to a special unit, experts believe having 
a plan implemented is more important than the number of resources allocated. Most plans 
consist of a threat assessment process, a caseload, and a monitoring procedure. The 
importance of a threat assessment and monitoring process was discussed in previous 
chapters. A vital piece of the plan and a significant component to a monitoring process 
involves the follow-up investigation or case management. Most threat assessment experts 
are strong advocates for establishing caseloads for investigators, which is the first step 
toward a monitoring program.254 Fein and Vossekuil believe that if “investigations suggest 
that a subject has the interest, motive, and ability to attempt an attack,” it is law 
enforcement’s “responsibility to manage the case so that violence does not occur.”255 
Fredrick Calhoun and Stephen Weston advocate private and public organizations’ 
establishing a “threat assessment process” rather than a “threat assessment program.”256 
They argue that calling threat assessment management a program may unintentionally 
suggest that threat management requires full-time personnel, so the organization will 
allocate necessary resources to mitigate the threat. On the other hand, a threat assessment 
process allows an organization the flexibility of assigning resources based on need and 
priority.257 Many agencies choose not to dedicate resources to threat assessment 
management, as they view a threat assessment case as a program versus a process. A 
publication distributed by the FBI acknowledged the staffing concerns of local law 
enforcement and that devoting resources might not be feasible for some agencies. The FBI 
mentions that each agency should consider threat assessment management based on 
practicability.258 Law enforcement officials realize that every agency faces different 
situations, and therefore, advocate for flexibility in a stated plan. 
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One significant responsibility for threat assessment management is monitoring 
potential subjects. Experts have identified different ways to monitor a subject, which does 
not necessarily mean tracking the person. In some instances, especially if no crime has 
occurred, investigators may want to confront these individuals and advise them that their 
behavior is so inappropriate that they are the subject of an investigation.259 In the USSS’s 
Threat Assessment in Schools: A Guide to Managing Threatening Situations and to 
Creating Safe School Climates, the authors affirm that in some cases, confrontation is 
required to help the individuals reset and realize their behavior is making people 
uncomfortable.260 In extreme cases, investigators may decide to take a covert approach 
and request additional resources, such as removing the individuals from their environments 
and seeking prosecution as the only way to ensure public safety.261 In both scenarios, 
investigators must be familiar with the individuals and understand the options available for 
intervention.  
Another significant responsibility in threat assessment management is making the 
commitment to close or suspend cases. Determining whether a person is no longer 
exhibiting concerning behaviors and whether the case should be closed can be difficult for 
some agencies, which is why some departments collaborate with community stakeholders. 
For example, the Virginia Tech Commission recommended a committee of personnel, each 
from a different discipline, help discuss issues and assist with resource allocation.262 The 
ability to consult other professionals with different perspectives is one avenue agencies can 
explore for assistance. Regardless of the adopted procedures, if an individual has met the 
investigator’s objectives, closing the case and ceasing continual monitoring is a necessary 
and appropriate step.263 According to Fein and Vossekuil, cases can be closed if the 
investigator can “1) articulate why a subject was originally considered to pose a threat, 2) 
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document changes in the subject’s thinking and behavior that negate the original concerns, 
and 3) describe why the subject is unlikely to pose a future threat to protected persons.”264 
The authors caution that in some cases, notifying individuals that their cases are closed can 
have adverse effects on them as they may view law enforcement as part of their support 
system. Officials recommend offering and maintaining services for these individuals, so 
they understand that help is available if needed.  
The level of commitment needed for accomplishing protective responsibility and 
managing threat assessments may be too much for some agencies. Smaller and mid-sized 
departments may not want to entertain the idea of allotting personnel to a monitoring 
process, and the additional resources may seem too extreme for some agencies to commit. 
Moreover, considering that even a part-time collateral duty could take away from other 
departmental responsibilities, department heads might hesitate to assign additional work to 
their most dependable employees. Conversely, not taking a proactive approach might place 
agencies in an uncomfortable position if they have failed to establish threat management 
practices. With several publications establishing guides for large and small agencies to 
address potential issues adequately, organizations are left with few excuses not to take a 
proactive approach to prevention.  
B. INFORMATION SHARING 
Law enforcement’s reluctance to monitor potential active shooters is also attributed 
to a lack of information sharing or intelligence distribution. According to Mark Lowenthal, 
“Information is anything known,” no matter how it was uncovered, whereas “intelligence 
is information that was processed, vetted and analyzed for a specific reason.”265 Most law 
enforcement professionals understand that sharing intelligence or information is a 
significant part of reducing active shooter attacks, yet a lack of information sharing is often 
a crucial part in failing to prevent mass casualty incidents. The reluctance to monitor 
potential active shooters is often due to an unwillingness to share information, restricted 
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access to intelligence, or unfamiliarity with information-sharing platforms. Ironically, 
some of the same issues regarding information sharing, such as interagency cooperation, 
that plagued federal law enforcement before the 9/11 attacks, continue to materialize within 
local, state, and federal agencies.266 The problems are not new but need to be examined 
and addressed. 
One of the obstacles among some law enforcement agencies is their failure to foster 
a culture based on the importance of information sharing. In his article, Doug Wyllie 
concludes that information-sharing issues have more to do with cultural and behavioral 
impediments than with technology.267 He attributes a lack of information sharing to silos 
created within agencies and the belief that information designated as intelligence should 
be shared only on a need-to-know basis. Agencies may also hold onto information to 
restrict information flow to enhance their status, as many believe that information is 
power.268 In a study on inter-agency information sharing in Southern California, Phillip 
Sanchez determined that many agencies were selective about the information they shared 
with their local intelligence centers and mainly based on what center they preferred to 
use.269 For example, his research concluded that the Los Angles fusion center received 
more information than was shared with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 
Explosives (ATF). He found this trend troubling considering that federal agencies try to 
foster a culture of collaboration and resource allocation.  
Law enforcement agencies have also hampered the information-sharing process out 
of purely selfish reasons. Some investigators may refuse to share information in the hopes 
of keeping leads and adding prestige to their agencies. Moreover, some departments tend 
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to hoard information if they believe a larger agency, with jurisdictional authority, may take 
the information and further an investigation, which may lead to a break in a case and 
generate positive press. In that instance, keeping the information is more beneficial than 
passing it on.270 Additionally, some agencies may underestimate the value they have in the 
intelligence-sharing process. That belief might be fabricated or be based on prior 
experience when intelligence officials disregarded their information. For example, Wyllie 
points to the 9/11 Commission Report, which cites instances where federal agencies refused 
to act on information disseminated by state and local law enforcement because it was not 
coming from the intelligence community.271 Feelings of animosity can quickly build, in 
any profession, if individuals feel their work is unimportant to the overall goal or success 
of the mission.  
Intelligence restrictions placed on state and local agencies pose another challenge 
to information sharing. As stated, it is not unusual for organizations, particularly at the 
federal level, to limit access to information. Most law enforcement agencies understand the 
importance of restricting access to classified information, but at times, local agencies may 
need a conduit when conducting threat assessment investigations. In some regions, 
departments have established relationships through area task forces, such as the FBI’s Joint 
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), and committed resources to aid with information sharing. 
However, the information is not entirely open for dissemination, as those JTTF members 
are also bound by the FBI’s policies, and intelligence deemed classified may be 
restricted.272 Additionally, the law does not permit sharing information on potential active 
shooter suspects who have not committed a crime but might in the future. According to 28 
CFR Part 23, which defines regulations for interagency information sharing, specifically 
states that law enforcement can share information with other agencies if it pertains to a 
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criminal investigation.273 If the suspect has not been implicated in a criminal investigation, 
then agencies are restricted from sharing certain types of information with allied agencies. 
However, 28 CFR Part 23 does allow agencies to keep intelligence files for their respective 
agencies, so long as the information is not shared with other organizations, which can be 
problematic when attempting to warn agencies of future threats that as yet have no nexus 
to a crime.274  
The MSD case study also showed issues with sharing information between school 
districts and law enforcement. Some statutes specifically protect against sharing students’ 
personal information, such as FERPA, or the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).275 FERPA, however, contains a clause for public 
safety that states schools are exempt from repercussions if sharing student information is 
for health and safety concerns.276 Additionally, the threat assessment team at MSD had a 
law enforcement officer assigned to the school, which would have given the sheriff’s office 
access to Cruz’s information to enable them to create and maintain in-house intelligence 
files. Unfortunately, in the MSD case, the information did not make it to the proper 
authorities to prevent the attack.  
The last information-sharing obstacle law enforcement confronts is deciding which 
organization is best suited to distribute or store the information. Information sharing is 
vital, but at times, law enforcement may face difficult decisions in pushing information out 
and deciding whom it should notify. Many law enforcement officials will point to a 
regional fusion center’s responsibility in monitoring and administering relevant 
information. Nevertheless, as Shane A. Salvatore explains in his study, not every fusion 
center is a relevant resource for intelligence sharing. He believes the reasons vary from 
cultural issues that materialized from a lack of interagency cooperation or a 
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misunderstanding of how intelligence centers can help law enforcement.277 Salvatore’s 
study is one example of departments needing to think outside their jurisdictional borders 
and take advantage of intelligence-sharing mechanisms implemented to enhance 
networking and interagency cooperation.  
Law enforcement agencies may not understand which information centers they 
should notify to help disseminate information. For example, the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) sponsors fusion centers, but they are state-owned and operated.278 If an 
agency needs to distribute information, it can turn to a fusion center, but it can also turn to 
other federal agencies. The FBI has a process called eGuardian, whereby citizens and law 
enforcement can report suspicious behavior through a webpage or call center, tips are then 
vetted and assigned to agents or taskforce officers for further investigation.279 With no 
clear indication in determining where information should flow, some after-action reviews 
have uncovered instances in which law enforcement decided to keep its intelligence in-
house and distribute the information as needed. For example, regarding the Odessa-
Midland case, after the Amarillo Police Department responded to Ator’s residence and 
located a bunker in his backyard, the officers were disturbed enough to share the 
information within their agencies. However, it is unknown whether the information flow 
continued or stayed in-house. By all accounts, the information probably did not go further 
than the Amarillo Police Department as no one else was aware of Ator’s concerning 
behaviors until after the shooting. 
Information sharing is one of the many issues that plague law enforcement’s 
inability to monitor potential active shooters. The technological advancements have all but 
eliminated the constraints placed on intelligence sharing through various systems, and the 
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barriers that exist are often self-imposed. However, because law enforcement officials have 
emphasized intelligence sharing within the law enforcement community, self-imposed 
obstacles can be overcome with time. The solution seems simple, but it is easier to identify 
silos and cultural obstacles than tear them down. 
C. LACK OF A NATIONAL TRACKING STANDARD 
As of 2020, law enforcement has no national standard for tracking or monitoring 
potential active shooter threats. In the absence of a standardized system of tracking 
individuals, law enforcement may be reluctant to implement measures that may result in 
future liability claims. Law enforcement experts have written guidelines outlining what a 
tracking or monitoring program should look like, and although these publications have 
notable recommendations, they are not a nationally adopted standard. Still, other agencies 
have taken the initiative to create programs and implement procedures based on lessons 
learned from after-action reports. In an article by the Buffalo News, an FBI agent giving an 
active shooter presentation admitted that his field office tracks potential active shooters to 
determine whether they are threats.280 Most departments understand the need for additional 
steps after a threat assessment investigation. Nevertheless, many agencies would like a 
definitive roadmap, backed by data, to articulate the need to track people and commit the 
necessary resources.  
The USSS has been at the forefront of publishing threat assessment guides for local 
and state law enforcement. Through their work, Fein and Vossekuil have outlined specific 
guidelines to track or monitor potential threats. The monitoring process, as discussed 
earlier in this chapter, does not necessarily mean constant surveillance, and the term may 
dissuade some agencies from committing to such a program. According to Fein and 
Vossekuil, once law enforcement conducts a threat assessment, investigators should keep 
intelligence files and monitor the individual’s progress. Part of the monitoring process 
should include allocating resources for the individual and addressing any stressors that will 
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cause the subject to act on impulses.281 In Threat Assessment and Management Strategies: 
Identifying the Hunters and Howlers, Calhoun and Weston explain that in the private 
sector, threat assessment managers need to monitor the behavior of employees who are 
exhibiting concerning behaviors. They explain that at certain times, it is appropriate to 
disclose to the employees that they are being watched as it may encourage them to change 
their behavior.282 
Based on the MSD case study, the commission’s final recommendation addressed 
inconsistencies in the school’s threat assessment process. While investigators pointed to 
threat assessment models by the USSS and State of Virginia, they also pointed to a lack of 
consistency in Florida schools. The commission found issues related to training and 
implementation of the threat assessment process.283 These issues would significantly 
impact how to manage future cases and gaps in concerning behavior identification. A lack 
of consistency also leads to a lack of a viable monitoring program and reduces prevention 
efforts toward future attacks.  
Managing the monitoring files may also cause hesitation among law enforcement 
officials, as it adds a layer of accountability and risk management for the agency. Most 
experts agree that case management and intelligence storage should include only personnel 
with a need to access the information.284 Agencies are encouraged to train their case 
managers properly and ensure they understand the importance of accessing that type of 
intelligence. While most of the information housed in intelligence files is part of a potential 
criminal investigation, some information may include issues concerning the subject’s 
mental state or other medical conditions.  
Experts have also published guidelines to help law enforcement investigators with 
criteria to consider when a person needs monitoring. Law enforcement administrators may 
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be hesitant to monitor or track individuals that have yet to commit a crime, as it may lead 
to constitutional implications. The hesitation is understandable, and diminishing any 
apprehension is based on the policies and procedures established for each threat assessment 
program. For example, most threat assessment models have a set of criteria to determine 
whether the person is a threat or merely venting out of frustration. Based on how the 
investigator assesses a person’s behavior or how the subject answers specific threat 
assessment questions, can determine if this individual is categorized as a potential 
threat.285 Each threat assessment model may vary and cause law enforcement to hesitate 
to monitor an individual, but the foundational concepts on deciding if a person is a threat 
remain consistent. The essential components initially developed for the USSS leave room 
for modification but offer guidelines to assist agencies in making these crucial decisions.  
Most experts understand a need exists for law enforcement to track potential active 
shooters, but some agencies are hesitant to implement a monitoring system absent from a 
standardized process. What they need to realize is that many agencies have shared 
information dedicated to helping departments enhance their intelligence and monitoring 
programs. The guidelines are broad enough to give each agency discretion over what 
procedures they will employ but specific enough to address pressing issues related to safety 
or liability concerns. 
D. SUMMARY 
A tracking or monitoring procedure for potential active shooters is a noticeable gap 
in most active shooter prevention efforts. The reasons vary from one agency to another, 
but the constant is the agency’s willingness to prioritize a monitoring plan. As identified in 
this research, agencies face several obstacles ranging from a lack of resources to inadequate 
information sharing, to a lack of a national tracking standard. An organization may have 
many reasons for failing to take the time to think critically about a strategy to monitor a 
potential active shooter. However, with so many targeted threat attacks taking place 
throughout the country, this topic should at least be discussed. Having a well-thought-out 
threat assessment plan, with a tracking component implemented, will pay dividends in the 
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future. At a minimum, an agency may be more prepared to answer questions surrounding 
prevention efforts and avoid stating it did everything possible when the research concludes 
that it did not.  
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V. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter examines the research findings, conclusions, and additional 
recommendations that need further attention. Each section answers specific questions that 
emerged throughout the research project and aims to address significant issues. 
Additionally, this chapter focuses on possible recommendations for closing the gaps 
uncovered throughout the project and highlights information-sharing networks that law 
enforcement can use in the future. While these recommendations do not offer a permanent 
solution for future active shooter events, they do add to the prevention efforts currently in 
place to help reduce existing gaps. One of the last sections discusses limitations 
encountered in the research and possible suggestions for future studies. Finally, this author 
gives his final thoughts, and discusses how the case studies impacted this study.  
A. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis analyzed why law enforcement has not taken an active role in tracking 
or monitoring potential active shooters. The question is crucial, as prevention plays a 
significant role in minimizing active shooter attacks. Additionally, it examined the various 
active shooter prevention guides and after-action reviews to determine what gaps exist in 
the tracking process. Moreover, this paper also uncovered what methods are available to 
monitor potential suspects and revealed existing models that law enforcement can 
implement to assist local agencies.  
The thesis took an historical look at the foundation of why law enforcement was 
not taking an active role in tracking potential active shooters. What the research found were 
five significant reasons why law enforcement had not historically taken a proactive role in 
monitoring potential suspects. On the surface, these problems may seem easily correctable, 
and to some extent they are, but law enforcement agencies need to make solving these 
issues a priority to close existing active shooter prevention gaps.  
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1. Response Centric  
As mentioned in Chapter II, after-action reviews and lessons learned from active 
shooter events are some of the reasons law enforcement was able to enhance prevention 
efforts. As law enforcement began working on targeted threats that later manifested as the 
active shooter, officers focused on methods and equipment that best neutralized the 
shooter. Many watershed moments led to turning points that saw law enforcement change 
tactics or strategies to deal with a problem better. These moments had a common theme, 
as most took law enforcement by surprise and left departments focused on solving the 
problem from the end state. That is, from the point where the incident ended, and not from 
the beginning, such as determining how to prevent the attack from occurring better. Each 
watershed incident enabled law enforcement to apply lessons learned from previous 
incidents, but the emphasis on police tactics meant that prevention efforts did not get much 
attention. 
2. Gaps in Threat Assessment Process 
This research project found significant gaps in the threat assessment and monitoring 
processes once law enforcement completes its portion of an investigation. For example, if 
a potential active shooter is arrested or involuntarily committed for a mental health hold, 
many departments do not have a system in place to monitor a subject’s progress. In 
addition, authorities find themselves in a precarious situation if a potential active shooter 
is only demonstrating specific concerning behaviors but has committed no violation. This 
indeterminate state of an investigation can also pose additional challenges for monitoring 
a subject who has broken no laws.  
3. No National Standard 
One of the main reasons law enforcement agencies have not made tracking potential 
active shooters a priority is because a national tracking or monitoring standard does not 
exist. With over 18,000 law enforcement agencies in the United States, law enforcement is 
not expected to have identical procedures for every agency, but they often adopt similar 
policies. Most departments will follow best practices that come out of law enforcement 
studies, academic research, or after-action reviews but still have the freedom to determine 
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how these lessons learned are implemented. For example, since 2007, the rescue task force 
concept—whereby fire and police work together to treat active shooter victims—has 
gained momentum.286 Most agencies prioritized and began using the rescue task force 
method as a universally approved approach to improve response and life-saving measures. 
This technique is an example of an operating procedure that was not mandated, but 
organizations saw value in the idea. Departments must place the same priority on a 
monitoring process, regardless of the type of model they choose to implement. 
4. Lack of Allocated Resources 
A fourth reason why law enforcement is not tracking potential active shooters is 
that some agencies are not allocating proper resources to a threat assessment program with 
a monitoring component.287 The terms tracking and monitoring may insinuate that 
agencies have to invest significant resources to follow people and watch their every move. 
Maintaining constant surveillance is not the goal of a monitoring procedure; rather, the 
purpose is to stay abreast of their progress. If at any point they begin to show concerning 
behaviors or suddenly face a stressful event, then investigators can mobilize resources to 
intervene before they act violently. Each threat assessment process could vary from one 
agency to the next. The plan might be comprised of a part-time person working on cases a 
few times each week or a full-time unit composed of multiple investigators with a full 
caseload.288 The objective of the plan is for each department to allocate some type of 
resource to the potential suspects and demonstrate that it has thoroughly analyzed the 
dangers that these individuals pose.289 Establishing a plan without proper follow-through, 
such as a monitoring process, notification procedure, or resource allocation, makes it 
difficult to close active shooter prevention gaps.  
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5. Information Sharing Obstacles 
The final reason preventing law enforcement from tracking potential active 
shooters is a lack of a viable information-sharing network. While many information-
sharing databases and networks exist throughout the country, some agencies do not have a 
system established to share or receive information. Several barriers play a significant role 
in sharing important information, such as an unwillingness to share information, 
intelligence sharing restrictions, and a lack of an identifiable intelligence sharing clearing 
house. These factors present problems for the flow of information form one agency to the 
next but can be rectified with consistent education from the intelligence community, and 
internal messaging within an agency. These obstacles play a significant role in preventing 
pertinent information on potential active shooters from reaching allied agencies within an 
identified region, and any solution to these problems must consider those obstacles.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the research and evidence gathered in this study, the recommendation is 
that agencies should adopt a threat assessment program containing a tracking and 
monitoring component. The case studies and research consistently revealed gaps with 
agencies that did not have a tracking process before an active shooting attack. In three out 
of four case studies, investigators obtained information that the suspects had displayed 
concerning behavior, but their agencies had no viable procedure to share that kind of 
intelligence. Therefore, allied agencies were unaware of the nearby dangers, and 
unfortunately, no resources were mobilized to help the individual. The first step is to 
establish a tracking and monitoring process once the initial threat assessment investigation 
is complete. The second step is that law enforcement must build a network that enables 
investigators to share confidential information with other agencies, so they know the 
dangers lurking within the community.  
1. Monitor and Track Progress 
Agencies need to develop a threat assessment program with an emphasis on 
tracking and monitoring potential active shooters. The size and scope of the program 
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should not be the primary focus, as the process and procedures are the most important 
factor. To field a serviceable program that helps meet that goal, an agency should: 
• Allocate resources for threat assessment investigations 
• Establish a tracking and monitoring process 
• Collaborate with stakeholders 
Agencies should not take on a threat assessment program on their own without 
proper resources, especially small- to mid-sized agencies struggling with staffing issues, 
so collaborating with other agencies may help relieve some staffing concerns. The main 
goal is to determine whether the potential active shooter suspect is a threat, and if so, 
mobilize resources to mitigate a targeted attack.  
a. Allocate Resources for Threat Assessment Investigations 
The foundation for a tracking and monitoring program is a viable threat assessment 
process. Agencies need to prioritize and allocate resources for a threat assessment process 
that best fits the size and scope of threats cases it receives each year. In some instances, it 
may mean a smaller agency has a process where one officer is assigned to threat 
assessments as a collateral assignment, where in larger agencies, the threat cases may entail 
a full-time unit. As Calhoun and Weston explain, the word process suggests that an agency 
has a plan and procedure established to investigate targeted threats. Additionally, a threat 
assessment program may suggest that an agency has fully dedicated resources to mitigate 
that threat. The designation is important, as some agencies may not have the resources to 
dedicate personnel to a threat assessment program but understand the dangers of a potential 
active shooter suspect. Recognizing the difference between the two terms and the need to 
establish a threat assessment process, no matter how small, allows an agency to prepare 
better than not having a plan at all. Failing to allocate resources to threat assessments, even 
on a part-time basis, could leave the community vulnerable to an attack. A lack of a threat 
assessment process after an attack could also result in the public questioning an agency 
over its active shooter prevention methods, or lack thereof, which could lead critics to ask 
whether more could have been done. 
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b. Establish a Tracking and Monitoring Process 
Active shooter prevention is difficult to achieve without making the tracking and 
monitoring of potential active shooters a priority. The law enforcement community has a 
variety of models that can help agencies establish a monitoring process. Regardless of what 
model departments choose to use or modify, they need to consider three factors. The first 
factor is that a tracking process is conducted on people deemed a threat, which ensures that 
the agency is using its resources on persons identified by an investigative process. The 
second factor involves implementing procedures designed to monitor the subjects and 
ensure investigators do not forget about them. The investigators tasked with handling the 
subjects’ cases need to recognize changes in behavior to mobilize appropriate resources, 
such as mental health professionals, counselors, or other community resources, that could 
help with triggering events or stressors. The final factor is a process to stop monitoring and 
tracking subjects that investigators believe are no longer a threat to the public safety. The 
removal process is just as important as monitoring the individuals on caseloads because 
maintaining people on a tracking program unnecessarily can be intruding on their 
fundamental rights to privacy. Law enforcement officials need to be cognizant of 
inappropriate monitoring, absent, reasonable suspicion or probable cause. 
c. Collaborate with Stakeholders 
Resource allocation starts with strong collaboration among stakeholders, and many 
agencies have implemented a variety of models that other departments can mimic. The 
basis of a robust active shooter prevention program is to get potential suspects in crisis help 
and intervene before they act on their impulses. Most experts believe people may need help 
from a variety of different agencies besides law enforcement. For example, after the 
Virginia Tech shooting, the school established a committee composed of law enforcement, 
professors, counselors, and mental health professionals to assess students in crisis.290 The 
hope was to establish a team of professionals who could meet and collaborate on ways to 
help those in crisis the best. The philosophy behind committees like the Virginia Tech 
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Committee was that some professionals might bring different solutions to help an 
individual. In theory, possibly a great idea, but not taking collaboration seriously could 
render the process ineffective. In the case of MSD, they had a similar school committee 
established, but they rarely met, and it did not help prevent the deadly shooting that 
occurred at the school.  
2. Build an Information Sharing Network  
One of the main issues that came out of the case studies was the lack of 
communication or notifications made to other law enforcement agencies about a potential 
active shooter. Several after-action reports cited instances in which investigators did not 
make proper notifications or fully understand to whom to direct intelligence for 
distribution. This lack of communication presents apparent problems that can significantly 
affect prevention efforts. The best way to resolve these issues is to establish and build upon 
the following list of recommendations. 
a. Build a Robust Communication Process 
Law enforcement needs to look beyond allied agencies when attempting to 
establishing effective communication networks. Many state and federal laws allow public 
entities to share information with local law enforcement involving emergencies or public 
safety investigations. For example, FERPA allows schools to share a student’s private 
information with law enforcement if it pertains to a public health emergency.291 If a student 
decides to change schools, administrators could notify investigators to help with the 
monitoring process. Additionally, if the potential active shooter moves to another city, 
investigators could warn law enforcement within the subject’s new jurisdiction of the 
potential dangers. The notification process is a critical component in the prevention phase 
and can protect an agency from public scrutiny. For example, if the notified agency refuses 
to act and an attack occurs, few people might find cause to criticize the originating agency 
since it tried to notify the proper authorities to help prevent an attack.  
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Numerous states also afford law enforcement an avenue to seek information during 
a criminal investigation. For instance, California law enforcement can also use Section 
10850.3 of the Welfare and Institutions Code to direct state agencies, such as the state’s 
social services or similar agencies distributing government benefits, to assist with 
investigative information.292 This area could also be explored to ensure investigators have 
the most updated information. The notification process could work similarly to the one 
described with the new student notification. In either case, law enforcement needs to 
establish relationships built on trust and mutual respect. Taking the time to explain a 
situation to a person not familiar with police investigations may pay dividends towards the 
information the investigator receives for the current case and in future investigations. Also, 
those same individuals may assist in additional investigations, so building strong 
relationships can benefit future cases.  
b. Use of Open-Source Information  
Law enforcement also needs to consider researching and documenting all open-
source communications that materialize as a result of a complaint. In the age of social 
media, many individuals post warnings or threats through their social media accounts. In 
the case of the MSD shooter, at least two witnesses came forward and tried to report the 
suspect’s postings to the authorities, but nothing was done.293 While law enforcement is 
restrained from sharing certain kinds of intelligence files based on the 28 CFR Part 23 
guidelines, memorializing social media and other open-source intelligence information in 
a report is a viable option for documenting an incident. This type of documentation allows 
information sharing through lawful means as it is captured in a police report, and also 
accessible to the public. Authorities could then draw their own conclusions based on the 
information from the suspect’s postings. This investigative tool, when accessed 
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appropriately, could help with officer safety information, such as crime bulletins, or help 
investigators build a case that could prevent a future attack.294  
c. Strengthen Relationships with Intelligence-based Centers  
The final measure that could assist with information sharing is identifying an 
information center to house and distribute information. Law enforcement can become 
inundated with so many options and confused with who should receive its intelligence. 
While this project does not advocate for one intelligence clearing center over another, the 
simple answer is to at least forward pertinent information to a regional fusion center, which 
then filters the information and distributes it to allied agencies. If information related to a 
potential active shooter does not rise to a criminal investigation, agencies can at the very 
least notify the center that an individual was involved in an investigation and include an 
agency case number associated with the individual’s name. In the event an allied agency 
contacts the fusion center looking for information related to the individual, the fusion 
center can then connect the agencies without giving specifics on the case. The investigating 
agency is then able to request a copy of the police report in accordance with standard 
procedure. This scenario is an example of law enforcement’s not sharing the content of the 
information but allowing the investigating agency an avenue for obtaining information 
while still complying with intelligence-sharing regulations.  
C. LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  
During this research project, some issues resonated concerning basic threat 
assessment training for field officers. Many times, the initial threat calls that field officers 
are dispatched to investigate are often the most important, as it gives officers the 
opportunity to assess the situations. As discussed in Chapter II, since the MSD incident, 
many law enforcement agencies have taken the time to conduct thorough investigations 
related to target threats calls. However, the amount of training that front-line officers are 
receiving remains unknown. This topic merits further research to assess whether a lack of 
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training is leading to gaps in threat assessment investigations and information-sharing 
roadblocks. Without proper notification to threat assessment investigators tasked with 
conducting follow-ups on cases, then obvious gaps could materialize and cause significant 
issues. Furthermore, thorough investigations could help alleviate labeling individuals 
potential active shooters absent reasonable suspicion or probable cause. For example, the 
Santa Cruz Police Department (SCPD) implemented a policy whereby officers have 
specific questions they are required to ask subjects during a targeted threat investigation 
and procedures that help guide that investigation.295 SCPD wanted to ensure its officers 
were equipped with the proper training and resources to make a fair assessment and 
mobilize resources if warranted. Exploring the best training methods for field officers and 
establishing a framework for agencies could help further close existing active shooter 
prevention efforts.  
D. FINAL THOUGHTS 
Active shooter prevention is a complicated process consisting of a series of systems 
required to work in unison to maximize intervention efforts. One of the more impactful 
findings from the Chapter III case studies was that each responding or investigating agency 
had established processes to handle various active shooter related issues. From the MSD 
threat assessment protocols to the valiant rapid response from officers during the Las Vegas 
shooting, most agencies were preparing officers for an active shooter threat, and the 
awareness was evident by how each agency responded to the incident. However, what the 
case studies found was that protocols alone would not stop a threat without every aspect 
thoroughly evaluated to ensure unnecessary gaps had not gone unnoticed. At times, 
information was not shared and important intelligence about a potential threat was never 
disseminated. Without proper follow-through and an internal process to verify procedures 
are working appropriately, these gaps will continue to materialize. 
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Perhaps the most compelling information from the case studies was the overall 
prevention aspect of each incident, which led to this author categorizing each case 
according to the probability of preventing an attack. In incidents, such as the MSD shooting 
or Virginia Tech attacks, gaps existed and could be remedied through follow-through or 
changes in the notification procedure. In other cases, for example, the Odessa-Midland 
shooting or Las Vegas Mass Casualty Incident, the likelihood of preventing an attack was 
highly unlikely or impossible to predict. Coming to terms with that realization may be 
difficult for the public to understand, but in true transparency, law enforcement must be 
willing to discuss its limitations.  
Conversely, officials should continue to emphasize the importance of threat 
migration procedures already established, such as public awareness campaigns, 
community-based active shooter awareness presentations, site assessments, and law 
enforcement rapid response training. While each of these active shooter prevention 
procedures will not individually stop an active shooter attack, establishing a program that 
encompasses each element, as well as a tracking and monitoring process, will help close 
existing gaps. While law enforcement may not be able to predict every active shooter 
attack, the goal should be closing existing gaps to reduce the likelihood that an incident 
will occur in their jurisdictions.  
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